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ABSTRACT

Political and property crises present vital new questions for property
theorists, and analyses of state responses to these crises cast new light on
how property systems, and property law, adapt and evolve to meet
complex challenges—while remaining institutionally resilient themselves.
The novel coronavirus pandemic was an extreme, exceptional,
unexpected, significant “shock” event, with financial, economic, social,
cultural, and political impacts on a scale not experienced since at least the
1930s. The pandemic posed an unexpected, unpredictable, and urgent
Copyright 2022, by MARC L. ROARK and LORNA FOX O’MAHONY.
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threat to human life that demanded immediate action, delivered under
intense public scrutiny. The challenges were “wicked”: governments were
compelled to act, in conditions of uncertainty and in response to a complex
set of high-stakes problems, with imperfect information about the impacts
of policy choices or the likely endpoint of the pandemic. 1
In acting swiftly to protect their populations, governments adopted
radical strategies to shore up housing and home, to tackle street
homelessness, and to protect tenants and mortgagors from the threat of
eviction. Perhaps most notably, pandemic policies to protect housing
intervened with private property law in ways that were unimaginable
before spring 2020. In this Article, we examine the range of ways that
governments adapted their approaches to property, housing, and
homelessness during the pandemic. We analyze the adaptation of property
rules in the pandemic using the new theoretical and methodological
framework of “Resilient Property.” We consider the implications of the
actions to adjust the laws and policies that govern property, housing,
eviction, and homelessness, and reflect on the legacies of these actions for
property theories and property law.
I. PROPERTY AND THE PANDEMIC
As we write, the coronavirus pandemic has infected more than 428
million people worldwide, causing more than 5.9 million deaths. 2 New
variants of the disease have presented ongoing challenges for states and
cities, prolonging disruption in the face of planned re-openings and amid
urgent concerns about the economic impacts of lockdowns and the pursuit
of economic recovery plans. In March 2020, the United Nations
* Louisiana Endowed Professor of Law and Senior Fellow, Native
American Law and Policy Institute, Southern University Law Center; Associate
Research Professor, University of Pretoria, S.A.
** Professor of Law, University of Essex, U.K.; Associate Research
Professor, University of Pretoria, S.A.
1. See Edurna Bartolomé et al., Valores Bajo Presión: Estudio Preliminar
Sobre el Cambio de Valores ante la Crisis de la COVID-19 en España, 55
REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA 143, 144 (2021) (first citing CHARLES
F. HERMANN, INTERNATIONAL CRISES: INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
(1972)); and then citing BARBARA LUCINI, DISASTER RESILIENCE FROM A
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: EXPLORING THREE ITALIAN EARTHQUAKES AS
MODELS FOR DISASTER RESILIENCE PLANNING (Larry Winter Roeder, Jr. ed.,
2014).
2. WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb.
24, 2022), https://covid19.who.int/ [https://perma.cc/CR9C-7R5H].
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Conference on Trade and Development projected that the economic
slowdown due to the pandemic could reach $2 trillion. 3 By December
2020, OxFam forecast a significantly higher cost, projecting closer to
$11.7 trillion, including costs of prevention measures, research, and
government funding initiatives. 4 Economic forecasters predicted that the
pandemic will shrink global GDP by 4.5%. 5
The global coronavirus pandemic could be described as a “black swan
event”: 6 an extreme, exceptional, unexpected, significant shock event.
States mobilized resources to meet the pandemic by deploying funds to
ensure stability of housing, medical research, and economy. These
responses were highly visible due to the ubiquitous threat that the
pandemic presented globally and the nearly unprecedented closures that
states embraced. The challenges they faced were “wicked”: 7 governments
were compelled to act in conditions of uncertainty and in response to a
complex set of high-stakes problems, with imperfect information about the
impacts of policy choices or the likely endpoint of the pandemic. 8 Indeed,
at the time of writing, 18 months after the World Health Organization’s
declaration in March 2020 that the novel coronavirus was a global
pandemic, the endpoint and full impact remain unknown.
Early indications that the financial, economic, social, cultural, and
political impacts will be on a scale not experienced since the 1930s9
3. Coronavirus Update: COVID-19 Likely to Cost Economy $1 Trillion
During 2020, Says UN Trade Agency, UNITED NATIONS: UN NEWS (Mar. 9,
2020), https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/03/1059011 [https://perma.cc/R9EG7RRE].
4. Global Cost of Coronavirus: $11.7 Trillion, BUS. TODAY (Dec. 16, 2020,
5:46 PM), https://www.businesstoday.in/current/world/global-cost-of-corona
virus-this-is-how-much-covid19-pandemic-has-cost-the-world-economy/story/4
25100.html [https://perma.cc/QA35-D3LZ].
5. M. Szmigiera, Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic on the Global
Economy – Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www
.statista.com/topics/6139/covid-19-impact-on-the-global-economy/ [https://perm
a.cc/W93R-VVK2].
6. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2d ed. 2010); see Punit Renjen, The Heart of Resilient
Leadership: Responding to COVID-19, DELOITTE INSIGHTS (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/insights/economy/covid-19/heart-of-resilientleadership-responding-to-covid-19.html [https://perma.cc/N4RD-AYU7].
7. See infra Section II.B. Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas
in a General Theory of Planning, 4 POL’Y SCIS. 155 (1973).
8. See Bartolomé, supra note 1; LUCINI, supra note 1.
9. A report published by the U.S. Congressional Research Service indicated
that the negative impact on global economic growth in 2020 was beyond anything
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distinguish the COVID-19 pandemic from other financial and economic
crises and recessions—including the Great Recession of 2008, the first
worldwide recession of the global age. 10 Analysis published by Deloitte
explained that “[r]ecessions since World War II have usually been caused
by either economic policy mistakes, oil shocks, or financial bubbles. The
rapid economic deterioration of economies and stock markets amid the
COVID-19 threat represents a new category: a global societal shock.”11
The report further noted:
Whereas the 2008 global financial crisis was stoked by the shutoff
of the supply of capital, disruptions on both the supply side and
the demand side are the cause this time around. . . . Meanwhile,
the mass quarantining of the population cut off consumption, most
acutely in the travel, hospitality, restaurant and retail sectors. 12
By mid-2020, economists had predicted major economic, financial, and
social crises, 13 with immediate and long-term health, economic, and social
impacts borne disproportionately by lower socio-economic populations
and by Black and ethnic-minority people. 14
States acted rapidly and under pressure, taking decisive action to
contain the spread of the virus. The actions taken to mitigate risk and
reduce the spread of contagion departed from established norms in many
jurisdictions and imposed costs across a range of scales—for individuals,
businesses and industry, markets, and communities. Forced lockdowns led
to closures of courts; businesses embraced telecommuting to enable
workers to comply with work-from-home orders; and reduced
consumption acutely affected those businesses that depend on foot traffic
and in-person services, such as restaurants, small merchants, and tourism.
National governments mobilized significant resources to mitigate the
impacts for individuals, communities, businesses, and industries, while
local authorities led on-the-ground responses. Many states invested
in nearly a century—since the 1930s depression-era. JAMES K. JACKSON ET AL.,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46270, GLOBAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COVID-19, at 13
(2021).
10. See A. TOOZE, CRASHED: HOW A DECADE OF FINANCIAL CRISIS
CHANGED THE WORLD 3 (New York: Penguin Books 2018).
11. Renjen, supra note 6.
12. Id.
13. See Maria Nicola et al., The Socio-economic Implications of the
Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19): A Review, 78 INT. J. SURG. 185 (2020).
14. Adam Goldstein & Diana Enriquez, Covid-19’s Socioeconomic Impact
on Low-Income Benefit Recipients: Early Evidence from Tracking Surveys, 6
SOCIUS 1, 2 (2020).
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considerable resources in the development of vaccines on a significantly
accelerated timeline relative to any previous vaccination development
program. Regulations that would have delayed the deployment of vaccines
were relaxed to overcome barriers to rapid distribution. As national
governments saw the devastating human and economic threats that the
novel coronavirus posed—and the implications of these threats for their
own authority and legitimacy—states responded.
In acting swiftly to protect their populations, governments adopted
radical strategies to shore up housing and home, to tackle street
homelessness, and to protect tenants and mortgagors from the threat of
eviction. Perhaps most notably, pandemic policies to protect housing
intervened with private property law in ways that were unimaginable
before spring 2020. In this Article, we examine a range of ways that
governments adapted their approaches to property, housing, and
homelessness during the pandemic. Our approach to analyzing the
adaptation of property rules in the pandemic is based on the new
theoretical and methodological framework of “Resilient Property,” which
we developed in our forthcoming book, Squatting and the State. 15 It draws
on the central insights of Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory,
developing and applying these insights for property theory and property
law.
Our analysis draws examples from five jurisdictions: the U.S., the
U.K., Ireland, Spain, and South Africa. 16 Seeking out a middle ground—
15. LORNA FOX O’MAHONY & MARC L. ROARK, SQUATTING AND THE
STATE: RESILIENT PROPERTY IN AN AGE OF CRISES (2022).
16. Our choice of jurisdictions is purposive: four of the five jurisdictions are
governed by written constitutions, and these constitutions reflect historical waves
in property and constitution-making: the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1780;
the Constitution of Ireland was adopted in 1937; Spain’s most recent constitution
dates from 1978; and the South African constitution was ratified in 1996. In three
cases (the U.S., Ireland, South Africa), the adoption of a new constitution signaled
the remaking of a post-colonial/post-apartheid state and the redefining of
property/citizen/state relations under a new constitutional dispensation. Although,
as Purdy observes: “Irony and irenism ran together in early American attitudes,
partly because of ambivalence as to whether Americans were colonizers or a
colonized people.” JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM,
COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 70 (2010). Each of these five
jurisdictions has been influenced by the global transition from liberalism to
neoliberalism and affected by the aftershocks of the 2008 global financial crisis,
austerity, and the affordable housing crisis. See Desmond King & Stewart Wood,
The Political Economy of Neoliberalism: Britain and the United States in the
1980s, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM (Herbert
Kitschelt et al. eds., 1999); IRELAND UNDER AUSTERITY: NEOLIBERAL CRISIS,
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between abstract meta-theories or politically polarized binaries, and onthe-ground doctrinalism—Resilient Property is rooted in contextualized,
historicized accounts of state action with respect to private property. It
focuses on the systems that create property outcomes, seeking to build a
realistic understanding of how these are adjusted: through tactics,
strategies, and advocacy, but also through events and externalities. Our
approach aims to develop new insights into how property works, as well
as what works, when states respond to property problems.
Eschewing the ab initio philosophical commitments that characterize
much liberal property theory, Resilient Property Theory focuses on
developing a new mode of thinking about property and the methodological
and analytical tools to enable this. To this end, our approach echoes neopragmatism in seeking first to understand state responses to property
problems in a complex, multi-scalar governance framework. Wood and
Smith explained that:
[O]ne of the central features of pragmatism is that it is a way of
thinking that is grounded in anti-foundationalism. Ideas are not
transcendent, fixed truths, rather they are outcomes of embodied
experiences and instrumental actions that are dynamic, contingent
and continually evolving. Decades before the first poststructuralist utterances, the early pragmatists were turning away
from meta-narratives, objective truths, and unifying theories,
preferring instead to develop modes of thinking, which they
believed had greater utility for helping people to cope with the
messiness of everyday life. 17
Resilient Property offers techniques for engaging with—while not
eliding or transcending—the “messiness” of property problems, echoing
this pragmatic concern for dynamic, contingent, and continually evolving
modes of thought. Finally, our analysis of state-level and city-level
responses to squatting also resonates with the concept of “pragmatic
localism”—the proposition that high-scale ideology (given effect through
national policy) can be mediated to deliver “what works” to solve policy
NEOLIBERAL SOLUTIONS (Colin Coulter & Angela Nagle eds., 2015) [hereinafter
IRELAND UNDER AUSTERITY]; Cornel Ban, Neoliberalism in Translation:
Economic Ideas and Reforms in Spain and Romania (2011) (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Maryland, College Park) (on file with the Digital Repository,
University of Maryland); PATRICK BOND, ELITE TRANSITION: FROM APARTHEID
TO NEOLIBERALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA (London: Pluto Press 2014).
17. Nichola Wood & Susan J. Smith, Pragmatism and Geography, 39
GEOFORUM 1527, 1527 (2008).
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problems at the local level;18 indeed, “not just ‘what works, but what
works here.’” 19
Resilient Property Theory offers a fresh lens through which to
understand the nature and effects of state action with respect to private
property in periods of crisis and pressure. In what has become an “age of
crises,” the coronavirus pandemic exemplifies a compound health/
economic/property crisis. Each state’s response can be understood relative
to other nation-states, as well as in relation to its own background
commitments—the pre-pandemic property nomos20 or “normative
universe” of legal texts, decisions, norms, and narratives that frames state
responses to property challenges in each jurisdiction. We review state
responses to eviction, housing, and homelessness during the pandemic,
reflect on the extraordinary steps that states have taken to shore up
occupation—enabling people to shelter in place—and evaluate the impact
of the pandemic through a Resilient Property lens.
II. RESILIENT PROPERTY
A. Resilient Property Theory
State-developed strategies, tools, and interpretive norms in response
to property crises reveal new legal, political, and public discourses of
property. In an era of polarized, high-salience political discourse about
property values, states’ responses to the pandemic provide important
signals about the states’ stake in private property problems. The legitimacy
of state action with respect to private property rights is a prominent theme
in theoretical debates about the nature of property. 21 Indeed, property is
18. Jon Coaffee & Nicola Headlam, Pragmatic Localism Uncovered: The
Search for Locally Contingent Solutions to National Reform Agendas, 39
GEOFORUM 1585, 1591 (2008).
19. Id. at 1587 (citing Patricia M. Shields, Classical Pragmatism: Engaging
Practitioner Experience, ADMIN. & SOC’Y 36(3), 351–61 (2004)).
20. Robert M. Cover, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 66 (1983).
21. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8
(1927). The recent resurgence of interest in this theme was captured in a 2017
special issue of Theoretical Inquiries in Law. See, e.g., Laura. S. Underkuffler,
Property, Sovereignty, & the Public Trust, 18 THEOR. INQ. L. 329 (2017); Larissa
Katz, Property’s Sovereignty, 18 THEOR. INQ. L. 299 (2017); Hanoch Dagan &
Avihay Dorfman, The Human Right to Private Property, 18 THEOR. INQ. L. 391
(2017); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and Sovereignty, Information, and
Audience, 18 THEOR. INQ. L. 417 (2017); Sergio Dellavalle, The Dialectics of
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unique amongst legal and political institutions for the conflict between
competing accounts, which alternatively define it as a product of the
political state or as a natural right prior to the state. This conflict is
foregrounded in periods of heightened inequality, conflict, or austerity.
Most recently, conflicts over access to resources have intersected with an
exclusionary turn in the politics of belonging. 22 Private property is
imbricated at the heart of these conflicts. It is suggested that property law’s
raison d’être is to protect the status quo of existing property rights. Yet
property law also remains central to the pursuit of appropriate and
workable solutions to the challenges and conflicts inherent to governing
property-as-resource. 23
Competing visions for the role of property law and property
scholarship underline the scale of conflict between accounts of private
property. These conflicts seem particularly irreconcilable; this is
heightened by the putative rivalrous nature of property claims. In some
contexts, new property conflicts have prompted creative responses that
destabilize conventional frameworks—from tradeable pollution permits to
digital-property-commons licenses. 24 Yet the well-established property
conflicts implicated in the law of eviction, housing, and homelessness
appear only to intensify debates about how (and whether) states act to
balance competing individual (private) and community (public) claims.
Philosophical theories of property25 are often structured around binary
Sovereignty and Property, 18 THEOR. INQ. L. 269 (2017); Eyal Benvenisti,
Sovereignty and the Politics of Property, 18 THEOR. INQ. L. 447 (2017).
22. See, e.g., Ananya Roy, Paradigms of Propertied Citizenship:
Transnational Techniques of Analysis, 38 URB. AFFS. REV. 463 (2003) (arguing
that definitions of background imperialism in property shape the content of all
persons in relationship to property); Marc L. Roark, Under-Propertied Persons,
27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2017) (describing the tropes of resilience
created in property owners against others through doctrines like nuisance and
waste).
23. J. Peter Byrne, The Public Nature of Property Rights and the Property
Nature of Public Law, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY (Robin Paul
Mallory & Michael Diamond eds., 2016).
24. Id. at 12.
25. This feature extends across the field, from morality or efficiency-based
accounts to pluralist or “progressive” theories. Gregory S. Alexander et al., A
Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 742, 743–44 (2009)
(stating that property implicates pluralistic and incommensurable values,
including individual, collective, social, and environmental interests, amongst
others); but see Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of
Progressive Property, 101 CAL. L. REV. 107, 107 (2013) (arguing that progressive
property’s failure to include distributional injustice in its set of policy concerns
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frames that reflect underpinning political commitments along a left–right,
community–liberty, public-interest–private-rights spectrum. For example,
recent debates in property scholarship have developed frameworks based
on: property/sovereignty;26 monism/pluralism;27 and exclusion28/
inclusion29 or sharing. 30 Through these frameworks, arguments are
advanced on behalf of competing interests and claims to property’s
rivalrous resources.
The structure of private property discourse has important implications
for property scholarship. The use of binary frames potentially reinforces
the neoliberal worldview, which—rhetorically at least—relies on these
binary distinctions to position private power, embodied in “the market,”
as the source of individual freedom and wealth maximization while public
power, as embodied in “the State,” is characterized as “oppressive,
inefficient and [to] be restrained and limited at all costs.”31 This
weakens progressive property’s claim to represent the full set of progressive
values); Stacy L. Leeds, By Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal
Perspective on Taking Land, 41 TULSA L. REV. 51, 53 (2005) (noting the tendency
to discuss property problems by excluding the experience of people of color and
indigenous persons).
26. Cohen, supra note 21, at 8; see also 18 THEOR. INQ. L. (SPECIAL ISSUE
ON PROPERTY & SOVEREIGNTY) i (2017).
27. See Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1409 (2012); Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1017 (2011); Jedediah Purdy, Some Pluralism About
Pluralism: A Comment on Hanoch Dagan’s Pluralism and Perfectionism in
Private Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 9 (2013).
28. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L.
REV. 730 (1998); JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW (1997);
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007); Eric R. Claeys, Labor, Exclusion, and Flourishing in
Property Law, 95 N.C. L. REV. 413 (2017).
29. Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 860 (2014)
(arguing that property law authorizes and enables “inclusion” through a range of
informal, contractual, and proprietary techniques including easements, leases, and
trusts).
30. Compare James Y. Stern, What Is the Right to Exclude and Why Does It
Matter?, in PROPERTY THEORY: LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 38–68
(James E. Penner & Michael Otsuka eds., 2018) (questioning whether a property
model based on sharing truly excludes less-than-traditional exclusionary models
of property), with Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Sharing the Cathedral, 46 CONN. L. REV.
647, 650–51 (2013) (describing sharing as “the conceptual opposite” of exclusion
and as a traditional exception to the general rule of exclusion).
31. Paul O’Connell, The Death of Socio-Economic Rights, 74 MOD. L. REV.
532, 535 (2011); see, e.g., GREG ALBO ET AL., IN AND OUT OF CRISIS: THE
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oppositional structure—epitomized in the bifurcation of legal realism into
law-and-society on the left and law-and-economics on the right—has a
tendency to generate politically polarized analyses, with all the risks and
perils that follow when scholarly discourse splits into “a fairly distinct
right and left that mostly talk past each other . . . .”32 The dominance of
politically polarized property theories in contemporary property discourse
also tends to privilege a unidirectional account of the nature and effects of
state action or restraint on individuals and communities, while obscuring
the interactional effects of property problems on individuals and
institutions—including the state itself.33 Indeed, the scope and legitimacy
of state action vis-à-vis vested private property rights has become a
lodestone of modern U.S. property discourse. One implication of the
political philosophy bias in contemporary property theory is the tendency
to privilege normative theories for state action or restraint, over realistic
accounts of state action.
Resilient Property Theory reaches beyond conventional property
theories as theories for state action—theories that seek to provide
normative direction to states regarding the scope of effective and
legitimate action in the realm of private property—to construct a theory of
state action for property scholarship. Resilient Property Theory is
anchored in the dynamic, responsive role of states as stakeholders in
wicked property problems. Focusing on state responses to property
problems in periods of property crisis, Resilient Property Theory maps the
intersections between state action that allocates resilience to individuals
and the state’s (or the government’s) own interest in shoring up its
resilience through crises. In doing so, Resilient Property departs from the
contemporary ideological current in property discourse, which focuses on
advancing normative agendas for state action, typically along progressive–
conservative lines. Instead, we seek to understand the complexities of state

GLOBAL FINANCIAL MELTDOWN AND LEFT ALTERNATIVES 28 (2010); DAVID
HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005); RAYMOND PLANT, THE
NEO-LIBERAL STATE (2010); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Law, Markets and Democracy:
A Role for Law in the Neo-Liberal State, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 801 (2006).
32. Steven L. Winter, The Next Century of Legal Thought, 22 CARDOZO L.
REV. 747, 748 (2001).
33. The state’s role is alternatively defined as a duty to forbear from
interference with private property rights or a duty to take account of the interests
of all members of the community. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA (1974); Underkuffler, supra note 21, at 331 (advocating for a fiduciary
role of the state in balancing interests of property holders and collective interests
in takings cases).
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action in response to property problems, across a range of jurisdictions,
and in the context of the changing pressures on the state. 34
In The Construction of Property, Lehavi argued that property theory
does not—for definitional purposes—inherently require that we subscribe
to core content: asserting that while the concept of property has structural
and institutional traits, it has no “inherent essence.” 35 Rather, Lehavi
argued, property law’s “essence” flows from whatever each society’s
institutions choose to promote as values and goals. The structural traits of
property provide the frameworks for translating these ideals from moral
and social concepts into legal concepts, working through the interactions
of legislatures, courts, and the professional organizations of civil society
(legal and social institutions) that create property norms. While Lehavi
shifts the focus from natural, morality- or rights-based content to the
political and social institutions that create property norms, the implication
remains that the state and other social institutions choose to promote
particular normative agendas based on prior normative commitments.
Resilient Property recognizes that in reality, these “choices” are
contextualized and constrained by a range of factors that are both within
and beyond the control of the state itself or the social institutions it sustains
(for example, the market). State responses to property problems are
dynamically shaped, and sometimes constrained, by a complex array of
competing, at times overlapping, influences: from multiple or hybrid
property ideologies, to the implications of property practices “on the
ground,” in the context of national and international events and
externalities.
The dominant narratives of contemporary Anglo-American private
property law tend to “look away” from the state as a primary actor in the
shaping and re-shaping of property law or to characterize the state as a
neutral arbiter of competing claims. Yet as we have seen time after time,
periods of crisis reveal the enduring, inherent, and latent powers of liberal
state institutions to direct the property system in ways that have significant
implications for the resilience of individuals, institutions, and
governments themselves. Resilient Property Theory analyses recognize
how states’ own vulnerabilities frame their responses to property
34. To be sure, we are not the first to suggest ways to break a polarizing view
of problems to reach common solutions. See, e.g., David A. McDonald, Defend,
Militate, and Alternate, in POLARISING DEVELOPMENT: ALTERNATIVES TO
NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS 125–26 (Lucia Pradella & Thomas Marois eds.,
2015) (suggesting approaches that facilitate “context-based evaluations that
acknowledge local norms but do not fetishize difference”).
35. AMNON LEHAVI, THE CONSTRUCTION OF PROPERTY: NORMS,
INSTITUTIONS, CHALLENGES (2013).
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problems, as state actors and agencies seek to accumulate and preserve
their own resilience at the same time as allocating resilience to other
stakeholders. This need is foregrounded when states act to shore up their
authority and legitimacy in the face of conflict or crises. Crucially, this
insight helps us to recognize that states—particularly in periods of
property crises—are not neutral arbiters between competing claims.
Resilient Property Theory re-positions the multi-level state as a central
institution for property theory, reminding us that when states act on behalf
of individuals (e.g., owners, squatters, market actors, community
members) and institutions (e.g., markets, private property, society), they
do so against the backdrop of their own self-regarding need for resilience.
Davidson and Dyal-Chand argued that property crises open up
contestable spaces in ongoing debates about the balance between public
and private sovereignty—which may or may not leave a lasting impact on
residual property norms after the period of crisis has passed. 36 States’
responses to the problems of eviction, housing, and homelessness during
the global financial crisis have reflected the changing factual and
normative landscapes against which property problems are understood.
They also, more fundamentally, reveal the roles that states play in shoring
up the resilience of private property rights, owners, markets, and others,
all while reflecting on the effectiveness and legitimacy of the state itself.
As nation-states navigate new landscapes of statehood and sovereignty
against the backdrops of globalization, 37 political polarization and partisan
antagonism, 38 and—most recently—the extraordinary pressures resulting
from the coronavirus pandemic, Resilient Property Theory offers a call to
action: for property scholarship to recognize and reconsider the role and
nature of the state and to examine and address the implications of stateresilience (or state-fragility) on responses to property problems.
36. Drawing on Ackerman’s account of transformational constitutional
realignments, Davidson and Dyal-Chand argued that, while the state has limited
resources to influence how property law develops outside of crisis moments,
property crises create moments of potential to punctuate the stable equilibrium of
property law’s evolutionary development. Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi DyalChand, Property in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607 (2010); BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
37. ULRICH BECK, POWER IN THE GLOBAL AGE: A NEW GLOBAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY 125–65 (2005) (describing distinctive strategies employed by states to
preserve power, including economic, preventative, and globalization strategies).
38. Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12,
2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarizationin-the-american-public/ [https://perma.cc/5MSW-VTF2].
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B. Resilient Property and Wicked Problems
The coronavirus pandemic and the economic, property, and housing
crises it has produced can be characterized as “wicked problems”:
complex social problems that, because they lack a shared interpretation or
collective understanding, are not readily subject to delimitation, attribution
of responsibility, or the identification of definitive solutions. Rittel and
Webber defined wicked problems as ill-structured and contingent: there is
no definitive statement of “the problem,” but an evolving set of
interlocking issues and constraints. 39 The problem cannot be understood
without first knowing its context, and different stakeholders have different
views about what the problem is and what constitutes an acceptable
solution. Solutions are proposed and evaluated in a context in which
“many parties are equally equipped, interested, and/or entitled to judge
[them],” but where their judgements are likely to vary widely depending
on the stakeholder’s independent values and goals. 40 Wicked problems
engender a high level of conflict among stakeholders, with no agreement
on the problem or the solution: “Nothing really bounds the problem
solving process—it is experienced as ambiguous, fluid, complex, political,
and frustrating as hell. In short, it is wicked.” 41
For example, Bratspies described “sustainability” as “a particularly
wicked problem, in part because of the lack of an institutional framework
capable of developing, implementing, and coordinating the responses
necessary to address the problem.” 42 Similar observations have been made
in relation to the long-term goal of reforming the food-regulation system,
which is hampered by the “diverse social, ethical, political, and legal
motivations and short-term goals” of stakeholders, 43 and in relation to
water-resource management, which is characterized by multiple
conflicting, non-commensurate perspectives. 44 Allen and Gould argued
that the reason many sustainability problems share the characteristics of
39. Rittel & Webber, supra note 7.
40. Id. at 163.
41. Nancy Roberts, Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to
Resolution, 1 INT’L PUB. MGMT. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
42. Rebecca M. Bratspies, Sustainability: Can Law Meet the Challenge?, 34
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 283, 292 (2000).
43. Sarah J. Morath, The Farm Bill: A Wicked Problem Seeking a Systematic
Solution, 25 DUKE ENVT’L L. & POL’Y F. 389, 402 (2015); see also Lorna Fox
O’Mahony & Neil Cobb, Taxonomies of Squatting: Unlawful Occupation in a
New Legal Order, 71 MOD. L. REV. 878 (2008).
44. Rebecca M. Bratspies, The Climate for Human Rights, 72 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 308, 317 (2018).
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wicked problems is that “[e]ach can be considered as simply a symptom
of some higher problem. . . . The definition is in the mind of the
beholder . . . . Furthermore, there is no single correct formulation for a
wicked problem, only more or less useful ones.”45
The complexities of wicked problems are often elided or avoided
through the selective use of narrative “frames.” These frames “select some
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
recommendation for the item described.”46 The frame determines how
responsibility for causation, intervention, resolution, and prevention are
attributed to individuals, institutions, and the state, and what solutions or
goals are intended to result from state action or forbearance. The use of
frames creates an impression that solutions can be found through the
application of a narrowing, selective lens. Inevitably, the choice of frame
(or explanation) determines the nature of the proposed resolution.
The choice of research or analytical methodology also performs a
framing function. Research methods set the agenda for research: defining
the questions that are asked by researchers and determining which issues
are explored and the types of evidence deemed relevant or appropriate to
frame, analyze, and answer questions. When specific methods or
approaches dominate within disciplines or sub-disciplines (for example,
doctrinal approaches to real-property law), the dominant method
determines the nature of the knowledge produced by the researchers in that
discipline. Sociologist John Law described the effects of methodological
hegemony as when specific approaches or research methods are so
monopolistic47 that “methods, their rules, and even more methods’
practices, not only describe but also help to produce the reality that they
understand.” 48
Conventional approaches to doctrinal and theoretical property law
have important framing consequences for property scholarship. Even legal
realist approaches to property, which seek to recognize and understand
property law as a dynamic going institution—in Dagan’s words, “a great

45. Gerald M. Allen & Ernest M. Gould, Complexity, Wickedness, and Public
Forests, 84 J. FORESTRY 20, 22 (1986).
46. Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured
Paradigm, 43 J. COMMC’N 51, 52 (1993) (emphasis omitted).
47. JOHN LAW, AFTER METHOD: MESS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 4–5
(2004).
48. Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted).
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human laboratory” 49—often adopt an analytical frame that is bounded by
the institution of private property law, with litigation and case law at the
center. This has important consequences for what is seen, or not seen,
within this frame.50 Narrowing frames elide the complexities of problems
in ways that translate and make visible the official, relevant, or legible
aspects of the problem, while concealing (or, in Law’s terms,
“Othering” 51) aspects of the problem that sit outside the official or
dominant paradigm. As well as raising justice concerns, the effects of
framing can practically hinder attempts to solve complex or wicked
problems.
When conflicting ideas are located within distinct and competing
frames, there is a risk that problem-solving collapses into rhetorical
deadlock, with analyses and proposals advanced from distinct (and
sometimes polarized, political) positions that “mostly talk past each
other. . . .” 52 This creates a barrier to problem-solving. And when
problems seem like “lost causes,” collective action is inhibited. Thomas
Ross articulated this dilemma in his essay, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their
Immorality, Our Helplessness. Ross observed that poverty is typically
characterized by courts as an unsolvable problem: “[one] of daunting

49. Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Other Half of Regulatory Theory, 52
CONN. L. REV. 605, 627 (2020).
50. Dagan reasoned that
because the judicial drama is always situated in a specific human context,
lawyers have constant and unmediated access to human situations and to
actual problems of contemporary life. This contextuality of legal
judgments ensures lawyers a unique skill in capturing the subtleties of
various types of cases and in adjusting the legal treatment to the distinct
characteristics of each category.
HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS xxi (2011). Indeed, it
can hardly be surprising that relying on litigation as the primary (or sole) empirical
source, property’s organizing concepts are geared to over-represent the privileged
property insiders who enjoy particular advantages in access to justice through
legal advice and litigation. Lorena Fox O’Mahony, Property Outsiders and The
Hidden Politics of Doctrinalism, 67 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 409 (2014); see also
HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING
TO LAW 101 (1999) (discussing access, and lack of access, to law and justice).
51. LAW, supra note 47, at 85.
52. Winter, supra note 32, at 748 (2001) (“[T]he related instrumentalism and
consequentialism of the realists can be seen (in sometimes extreme form) in the
political polarization of the academy—where there is a fairly distinct right and
left that mostly talk past each other . . . .”).
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complexity that is virtually beyond solution.”53 By tacitly accepting that it
is a complex and daunting problem—a wicked problem—stakeholders (in
Ross’s analysis, judges) abdicate responsibility to seek out solutions,
deeming themselves helpless to act:
We assume that the eradication of poverty, even if possible in
theory, would require the radical transformation of our society.
The causes of poverty, we assume, are a product of a complex set
of factors tied to politics, culture, history, psychology and
philosophy. Thus, only in a radically different world might
poverty cease to exist. And, whatever the extent of the powers of
the Court, radically remaking the world is not one of them. 54
This rhetoric of helplessness underpins the official narrative that “[h]ard
choices, suffering, even ‘Kafkaesque’ results are simply unavoidable.”55
Private property is frequently implicated in wicked social problems.
The reference to private property is rarely a neutral claim, but rather is
ladened with philosophical or ideological meanings for what counts as
property, what limits are imposed on property, and when the state can
interfere with the claim of property rights—such as exclusion. The use of
theoretical frameworks that apply ab initio political or ideological lenses
geared to justify, direct, or challenge property’s power to complex
property problems prematurely narrows the analytical frame in ways that
are ill-suited to complex problem-solving. Because the art of dealing with
wicked problems demands that we do not prematurely apply a normative
lens in seeking out solutions, 56 wicked-problem-solving methods require
that we “remain in the mess”—keeping options open and exploring as
many relationships in the problem topology as possible before
synthesizing our understanding and starting to formulate solutions. This
orientation is also a key feature of Fineman’s vulnerability theory, which
offers insights for opening up complex, highly contested wicked problems
while adopting a perspective of epistemic humility. 57
53. Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our
Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991).
54. Id. at 1501.
55. Id. at 1499.
56. T. RITCHEY, WICKED PROBLEMS: MODELLING SOCIAL MESSES WITH
MORPHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (Boston, Mass: Springer International 2013).
57. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality
in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 2 (2008) [hereinafter
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject].
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C. Vulnerability Theory and Resilience
Resilient Property draws three key insights from Fineman’s
vulnerability theory. 58 First, we draw on Fineman’s general approach to
vulnerability and resilience; then on her insights concerning institutional
vulnerability, including the vulnerability of the state. Finally, we build on
Fineman’s framework to develop a third insight that provides a central
anchor for our analyses of state responses to squatting: that a necessary
implication of recognizing that the state itself is a vulnerable institution is
that we recognize the need for states to act in ways that build their own
resilience, to shore up their authority and legitimacy in the face of conflict
or crises. This third insight is central to Resilient Property Theory and
underpins our focus on “equilibrium” in Section II.C.2. It reminds us that
states are not neutral arbiters in relation to competing claims to land. It
reveals the realities of state action in response to squatting: that states are
required to negotiate their other-regarding responsibilities—adjudicating
and allocating resilience to individuals and institutions—against the
backdrop of their own self-regarding need for resilience. Finally, it enables
us to develop a realistic, contextualized conceptualization of state action
with regard to complex property problems.
Fineman’s vulnerability theory starts by rejecting the idealized,
imagined “autonomous and independent subject asserted in the liberal
tradition.”59 The alternative model of legal subjectivity she advances is
anchored in the inherent, universal, and constant human vulnerability of
“real-life subjects.” 60 Fineman argues that this “vulnerable subject” is
“[f]ar more representative of actual lived experience and the human
condition . . . [and therefore] should be at the center of our political and
theoretical endeavors.” 61 She describes the vulnerable subject as
“embodied and embedded.” 62 The embodied characteristics of the
vulnerable legal subject reflect the material realities of “bodily
vulnerability”—the flesh-and-blood vulnerability that “is apparent at the
beginning of life when we were totally dependent on others for our
survival” and that remains a constant component of our human

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 10.
61. Id. at 2.
62. Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability and the Institution of Marriage,
64 EMORY L.J. 2089, 2091 (2015) [hereinafter Fineman, Vulnerability].
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experience. 63 Fineman describes our ability to mitigate this embodied
vulnerability as changing over time and across the life course: “embodying
different needs and abilities, and often dependent upon others at various
stages of normal development.” 64 Although our ability to mitigate
vulnerabilities may change, our state of constant embodiment means that
“there is no position of invulnerability at any stage. Rather, individuals
have different degrees of resilience, which are found in the accumulation
of resources that mediate, compensate, or alleviate our vulnerability to
harm and injury as embodied beings.”65 For Fineman, the concept of
resilience articulates the means through which universal flesh-and-blood
vulnerability is mitigated and managed by accumulation of, access to, or
acquisition of resources 66 to enable us to adapt to, ameliorate, compensate
for, or contain our inherent vulnerability.
A second trope of Fineman’s theory is embeddedness. Each
individual’s experiences of vulnerability are structured through his or her
social embeddedness in the institutional structures and relationships that
provide resilience. This concept of embeddedness echoes the focus on
“webby relations and practices” in actor network theory. 67 Fineman draws
out the implications of embeddedness for resilience:
Even before the moment of birth, human beings are embedded in
63. Martha Albertson Fineman, Women, Marriage and Motherhood in the
United States: Allocating Responsibility in a Changing World, 2011 SING. J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 16 (2011) [hereinafter Fineman, Women].
64. Fineman, Vulnerability, supra note 62, at 2090.
65. Id.
66. Fineman describes sources of resilience as (1) physical resources:
housing, food, money; (2) human resources: education, training, knowledge,
experience; (3) social resources: relationships, social networks, family,
community, associations; (4) ecological resources: environments, clean air, and
water; and (5) existential resources: systems of belief or culture that help us to
understand our place in the world. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Afterword:
Vulnerability and Resilience, 36 RETFÆRD ÅRGANG 84 (2013) [hereinafter
Fineman, Afterword].
67. Actor Network Theory (ANT) describes individuals and institutions as
existing in webs of relationships amongst heterogeneous elements, including
humans, ideas, the state, and the law. When these relationships are linked around
common interests, purposes, or geography, they become “a network.” Thus, “to
speak of networks . . .is to speak of associations, of relations, of chains of
materially heterogeneous elements which make possible the existence of a
specific entity or actor.” Israel Rodríguez-Giralt, Isaac Marrero-Guillamón &
Denise Milstein, Reassembling Activism, Activating Assemblages: An
Introduction, 17 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 257, 258 (2018).
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webs of economic, cultural, political, and social relationships and
institutions. We are dependent on those relationships and
institutions because they support and sustain us. They are the
legitimate means through which we can gain the assets or
resources necessary to mediate, negotiate, or cope with our human
vulnerability. While there is no position of invulnerability, these
relationships and institutions provide us with resilience. It is our
reservoir of resilience that will determine whether we can not only
persevere, but be confident enough to take risks or recognize and
choose among options and opportunities as they arise over the life
course. 68
While vulnerability is characterized as constant and universal,
Fineman argues that “resilience is particular, found in the assets or
resources an individual accumulates and dispenses over the course of a
lifetime and through interaction with and access to society’s
institutions.” 69 Through this move, vulnerability theory shifts the
implications of legal subjectivity away from the individual and onto the
institutions that create, enable, and protect the “assets” of resilience—the
physical and material, social and relational, environmental and existential
capabilities to weather misfortune and to avail ourselves of opportunities.
Because vulnerability is understood as an inevitable and constant
characteristic of the human condition, Fineman’s vulnerability theory
demands that we resist the habit of defining the vulnerability of one
claimant (the squatter or the owner, depending on the moral lens applied)
in counterpoint to the presumed invulnerability of the other. Because it
resists labelling individuals as vulnerable or not vulnerable, vulnerability
theory reminds us to avoid conferring normatively loaded-up identities
onto particular subjects or populations (for example, victim/aggressor).
Fineman also distinguishes between “background resilience”—
accumulated over time—and the resilience that is allocated to mitigate
vulnerability in moments of crisis. Her approach reallocates the
differences in people’s outcomes away from the idea that people have
different vulnerabilities, to focus on differences in people’s opportunities
to accumulate and access resilience through their interactions with social
institutions. Echoing the methodological insights of wicked problem
theory, vulnerability theory seeks to avoid the trap of analytical frames
that prematurely narrow and constrain the problem space and limit
68. Martha Albertson Fineman & George Shephard, Homeschooling:
Choosing Parental Rights over Children’s Interests, 46 U. BALT. L. REV. 57, 61
(2016).
69. Id. at 62.
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potential solutions. Because she seeks to avoid “inherently privileg[ing]
any one outcome of political deliberation,” Fineman describes her
approach as “invit[ing], if anything, a high degree of epistemic
humility.”70
The second insight we take from vulnerability theory concerns the
inherent vulnerability of social institutions, including the state. Fineman
argues that, like people, the societal institutions we create to mitigate our
vulnerabilities—the market, the family, the welfare system, the institution
of private property, the state—“are also vulnerable to things like decay,
manipulation, corruption, and decline.”71 Fineman emphasizes that
“societal institutions themselves are not foolproof shelters, even in the
short term.” 72 Institutions enable us to “mediate, compensate, and lessen
our vulnerability” through the accumulation of assets of resilience, 73 but
these institutions are also themselves vulnerable: “They may fail in the
wake of market fluctuations, changing international policies, institutional
and political compromises, or human prejudices. Even the most
established institutions viewed over time are potentially unstable and
susceptible to challenges from both internal and external forces.” 74
The concept of institutional vulnerability is not unfamiliar to liberal
property theorists: indeed, concern for promotion and protection of the
institution of private property is a regular theme in liberal property
theories. The general assumption that property law decision-making must
protect and uphold the institution of private property implies that, without
appropriate normative direction, legal and policy decisions risk damaging
this foundational liberal institution.
For Fineman, the institutions that produce and provide resilience to
mitigate our vulnerabilities are central because the institutional structures
and relationships in which vulnerable subjects are embedded determine
each individual’s particular experience of vulnerability. Vulnerability is
mediated through the quality and quantity of resources (resilience) that we
inherit, accumulate, or are capable of accessing in any given moment:75
70. Anne Grear, Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism, and CoSymptomatic Injustice: Locating the Vulnerable Subject, in VULNERABILITY:
REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLICY 29, 49
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Anne Grear eds., 2016).
71. Fineman, Afterword, supra note 66, at 88.
72. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 57, at 12.
73. Id. at 10.
74. Id. at 12.
75. Martha Albertson Fineman & Anne Grear, Introduction, Vulnerability as
a Heuristic: An Invitation to Future Exploration, in VULNERABILITY:
REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS (2013).
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“[w]e are not born resilient; it is produced over time and within statecreated institutions and in social, political, and economic relationships.”76
Fineman also highlights the central role of the state in creating and
sustaining the economic (e.g., the market), social (e.g., the family), legal
(e.g., constitutions), and political (government) institutions that produce
and allocate resilience. 77 These institutions of resilience are created,
maintained, regulated, and backed by law, which confers legitimacy on
their operation and their power over individuals. 78
Fineman’s aim was to bring the state back into view: looking to the
state as a source of resilience and reimagining individuals’ relationships
to the state as a resilience-producing institution. Her interest in the state is
primarily geared around reconceptualizing its role as active but nonauthoritarian—what she terms a “responsive state.” 79 She describes this as
reflecting an underpinning reality—that the state is always actively
shaping institutions, although “present conceptions of the state
underestimate or even ignore the many ways in which the state—through
law—shapes institutions from their inception to their dissolution.”80 A
central concern for vulnerability theory is that, by looking away from the
state—and law—as a site of production for institutional resilience, we fail
to pay attention to the manner in which this resilience is allocated. 81 By
magnifying the state’s responsibility for the institutions and structures it
constructs and uses, Fineman advances her central normative claim:
“[v]ulnerability analysis demands that the state give equal regard to the
shared vulnerability of all individuals . . . .”82 The state’s responsibilities
thus extend both to all individuals and to “how the state has responded to,
shaped, enabled, or curtailed its institutions.” 83 In a further normative
move, Fineman asks:
Has [the state] acted toward those institutions in ways that are
consistent with its obligation to support the implementation and
maintenance of a vital and robust equality regime—a regime in
which individuals have a true opportunity to develop the range of
76. Fineman, Vulnerability, supra note 62, at 2090.
77. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 57, at 19–20.
78. Fineman, Women, supra note 63, at 16.
79. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 57, at 19.
80. Id.
81. “Currently, the state minimally supervises these institutions in fulfilling
their essential role in providing the assets that give us resilience in the face of
vulnerability.” Id.
82. Id. at 20.
83. Id.
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assets they need to give them resilience in the face of their
vulnerabilities? 84
Fineman argues that “[t]he realities of our universal, constant, and
inescapable vulnerabilities argue for a responsive state that ensures
equality of opportunity and meaningful, not merely formal, access for
individuals to society’s institutions.”85 This approach brings the operation
and impact of the state, its institutions, and structures into focus. Fineman
repositions this responsive state as a means of achieving “a more nuanced
sense of what constitutes equal opportunity than currently theorized—one
that is more sensitive to existing inequalities and more demanding of the
state.” 86
While we draw insights from vulnerability theory, Fineman’s ultimate
exhortation, that we should be “more demanding of the state,” highlights
a point of departure between Fineman’s approach and Resilient Property
Theory. Vulnerability theory seeks to bring the state under scrutiny as an
allocator of the assets of resilience:87 directing the state toward affirmative
obligations embedded in state action to allocate resilience between
individuals. Fineman’s normative agenda is to redirect the state to operate
in ways that do not unduly privilege some, while disadvantaging others.88
She says, “This focus on the structuring of societal institutions reflects the
fact that the state has an affirmative obligation not to privilege any group
of citizens over others and to actively structure conditions for equality.” 89
In this sense, vulnerability theory can be understood as a theory for
state action. At the same time, by recognizing the inevitable vulnerability
of social institutions, including the state itself, this theory creates a useful
space from which our Resilient Property approach explores the
methodological and normative implications of the state’s vulnerability: the
state’s own self-interested need for resilience. 90
84. Id.
85. Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality and Difference: The Restrained
State, 66 ALA. L. REV. 609, 626 (2015).
86. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 57, at 20.
87. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive
State, 60 EMORY L. J. 252, 255 (2010) [hereinafter Fineman, The Vulnerable
Subject and the Responsive State].
88. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 57, at 2–3.
89. Id. at 21.
90. While vulnerability theory has promised to bring the state under scrutiny
(see Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, supra note 87, at
255), most of the scrutiny is directed at the state’s failure to allocate resilience to
all persons, rather than scrutiny about what the state’s own interests may be in
allocating the resilience it parcels out.
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Applying the terminology used by John Law, property-related state
action is located in the “hinterland,” the nation-state nomos that produces
specific realities. Law underlined the importance of the hinterland in
shaping and constraining choices about which realities become “made” (or
“unmade”). However, he claimed that “[t]o talk of ‘choices’ about which
realities to make is too simple and voluntaristic. The hinterland of
standardized packages at the very least shapes our ‘choices’. We who
‘choose’ embody and carry a bundle of hinterlands.” 91
A similar observation can also be made in relation to state action with
respect to property: that the hinterland, or property nomos, shapes the
range of responses available to states with respect to property problems.
At the same time, it is important to be clear that we do not present this as
a deterministic argument: we are not implying that states have no choices
in how they respond to property problems. The property nomos in each
jurisdiction is not homogenous, but a complex hybrid of multiple norms
and commitments, sometimes competing, evolving over time, and scaled
across the layers of state action on property. Elements of this normative
universe can be dialed up or down in particular property moments, or in
response to property problems as they are manifest across the vertical scale
(e.g., national/local). We do not suggest that there are not alternatives to
the status quo; indeed, moments of crisis demand adaptations to the status
quo if equilibrium is to be restored. However, we do recognize the reality
that if alternatives to the status quo are to be successfully adopted and
sustained, they must be built on a legitimate hinterland, located within the
window of political possibility. 92 It is both rare and exceptional for the
stresses and strains on the property system to trigger a tipping point into
an altered state—generating a new constitutional or property-system
paradigm to work within (for example, the tipping point from apartheid to
post-apartheid state).
Resilient Property Theory builds on, but departs from, the insights of
vulnerability theory by following through the implications of the state’s
own institutional vulnerability: focusing both on the state’s role in
91. LAW, supra note 47, at 33.
92. Known as the “Overton window” after policy analyst Joseph P. Overton,
this describes the range of legitimate policy options that are acceptable to societies
in any given time. While other policy ideas exist beyond the Overton window,
politicians risk losing popular support if they champion these ideas. The Overton
window can move, expand, or contract, adjusting the range of acceptable policy
ideas as societal values and norms change. For an application of the concept to
global environmental challenges, see Antonina Suzdaleva, Ecological
Globalistics and the Paradigm of World Civilization Development, E3S WEB OF
CONFS. 217, 11003 (2020).
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allocating the resources of resilience, or its other-regarding role, and the
state’s own self-regarding claim to resilience. The state and its multi-level
institutions (global, regional, national, and local) flex and adapt over time
in response to changing contexts, stresses, and pressures. These
adaptations affect how actors and agencies across the multi-level state
mediate conflicting interests. Starting from a realistic account of the
contemporary state, we recognize that the governance of private property,
including responses to property problems through law, is a complex web
of interactions between citizens (individually and collectively) and
institutions, legal texts and interpretations, and regime goals and norms.
Demands made on the state, whether for or against state action, must be
understood in the wider context of the range of constraints applied to state
actors. Property scholarship requires methodologies that take into account
both the other-regarding responsibilities of the state and the state’s own
self-regarding need for resilience.
The dependencies generated by property scholarship’s reliance on the
state’s backing come into sharp relief in moments of pressure or crisis for
national or local governments. State responses reveal how the state’s
other-regarding responsibilities align with self-regarding actions
meant/intended to shore up the authority and legitimacy of state actors and
institutions. This focus on state vulnerability, and the processes through
which states create their own resilience, is timely in the current age of
crises. The methodology of Resilient Property takes account of the
multiple, intersecting vulnerabilities and resilience needs at stake when
homeless people squat on empty land. Our aim is to surface, understand,
and take seriously the full spectrum of individual, collective, and
institutional vulnerabilities at stake, including the state’s own stake in
property problems. By building a more complete picture of the
vulnerabilities and resilience associated with homeless squatting on empty
land, we are seeking to understand how the individuals (owner, squatters,
neighbors) and institutions (markets, communities, housing systems,
private property, and the state itself) that are implicated in these conflicts
marshal the resources of resilience. By focusing on the state’s own
vulnerability and resilience—alongside its power to selectively allocate
resilience to others—Resilient Property Theory offers a fresh perspective
on state responses to property problems—specifically, eviction, housing,
and homelessness—in the pandemic.
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D. Sustainability, Equilibrium, and Resilience
The insight that states are simultaneously both self-regarding—that is,
motivated to shore up their authority and legitimacy (the state’s own
resilience), particularly in periods of crisis and other-regarding—in the
discharge of governance functions—opens up a new frame for property
theory. For sure, the other-regarding role of the state with respect to
property interests, the protection of private property, and property
allocations has attracted considerable attention in contemporary property
theory. In her recent work on the fiduciary role of the state with respect to
private property, Underkuffler argued that the relationship between a
government and its citizens is based not in the social contract but on a
fiduciary relationship and that, as a result, the state acts under a duty to
take account of the needs of all members of the community.93
Underkuffler’s application of fiduciary theory to property offers a fresh
perspective through which to give content to the state’s responsibilities
toward property owners. Because the state’s other-regarding fiduciary
duty applies not only to property owners but to all citizens, the state is
required “to act with due regard for the [beneficiary’s] best interests.” 94 If
all citizens individually, as well as collectively, are “beneficiaries” of the
state’s power, the existence of a fiduciary duty demands that “government
at the very least must engage in serious reckoning with individual citizens’
(as well as collective) interests.”95
Underkuffler’s application of fiduciary theory to property theory
reaches beyond conventional state/owner or owner/non-owner binaries to
make the case for states to take account of the individual and collective
interests of non-owning members of the community. In deploying the
fiduciary lens, she simultaneously recognized the government’s
obligations toward property owners while also asserting that
[f]iduciaries, by reason of the demands of the fiduciary obligation,
are obligated to all of their beneficiaries equally. There is no basis,
in fiduciary theory, to rule in—at the outset—the claims of some
beneficiaries, and to rule out the claims of others. Government as
a fiduciary must reckon seriously not only with the needs of its
beneficiaries who own property, but also with the needs of those
who do not. 96

93.
94.
95.
96.

Underkuffler, supra note 21, at 342.
Id. at 346.
Id.
Id. at 348.
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The individual interests of property owners “must be considered,
seriously, in sovereign decision-making,”97 and Underkuffler’s
formulation of the duty-matrix of a fiduciary-state promises not to place
the claims of non-owners on equal terms with private property rights.
Underkuffler’s approach foregrounded the resilience of the liberal
institution of private property 98 but does not consider how the state’s own
vulnerabilities constrain the discharge of its fiduciary functions. Where
Underkuffler’s fiduciary property theory is a theory for state action,
Resilient Property Theory develops a realistic account of state action.
Fiduciary property theory focuses on the state’s duty in mediating the
competing claims of others but does not extend to consider the
implications and effects of state actions, in the exercise of its public
fiduciary duty, for the state’s own resilience: that is, for the perceived
effectiveness and legitimacy—the resilience—of the state. 99
To the extent that fiduciary theory, as it is broadly understood, is
premised on a concern to mitigate the risk of conflicts of interest between
the fiduciary’s own interests and the duty owed to beneficiaries (as
manifest in the “duty-interest conflict rule”), 100 the relationship between
97. Id. at 346 (emphasis removed).
98. For example, Underkuffler centers property rights as the “guardian” of
other human rights:
Of all conceivable human interests, none is more fundamental than the
ability to appropriate and retain property. It is a stark biological fact that
of all commonly asserted human rights, property claims are among the
most essential to human life. . . . the ability to live — and to appropriate
property to do so — is assumed by any other human right of which we
can conceive. When it comes to property, the stakes could not be higher.
In other words, government forbearance toward existing property
entitlements is rooted in property’s substantive function, and its required
guarantees.
Id. at 347 (emphasis in original). This can be contrasted with both Singer and Van
der Walt’s decentering of property rights in the wider constitutional or democratic
context. Van der Walt argued that property is not “the saviour, the knight on the
white steed, the guardian of every other right.” A.J. Van der Walt, The Modest
Systemic Status of Property Rights, 1 J.L. PROP. & SOC’Y 15 (2014).
99. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., SUPPORTING STATE-BUILDING IN
SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY: POLICY GUIDANCE (2011) (laying out
how developing and developed countries can better facilitate positive statebuilding processes and strengthen the foundations upon which capable and
legitimate states are built).
100. See, e.g., Whichcote v. Lawrence (1798) 30 Eng. Rep. 1248 (when a
trustee buys trust property for himself, he is not acting with “that want of interest,
that total absence of temptation”; “where a trustee has a prospect of advantage to
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state self-interest and state action is a salient consideration. Indeed, the
“state-as-fiduciary” model faces some complex challenges when applying
the duty of loyalty—the essence of the fiduciary relationship101—to stateactor fiduciaries. Fiduciaries are required to pursue only the interests of
beneficiaries when executing their duties; the duty of loyalty strictly
prohibits conflicts of interest and conflicts of duty, and fiduciary law
provides powerful remedies to strip fiduciaries of any personal benefit
obtained through their fiduciary position. 102 The conflict-of-interest rule
prohibits the fiduciaries from allowing personal interests to conflict with
the interests of the beneficiary—thus prohibiting disloyal conduct
grounded in the self-interest of the fiduciaries, 103 while the conflict-ofduty rule prohibits fiduciaries from acting under conflicting mandates. 104

himself, it is a great temptation to him to be negligent”); Aberdeen Ry. Co. v.
Blaikie Bros., 1 Macq. 461, 149 Rev. Rep. 32 (H.L. 1854) (appeal taken from
Scot.) (where the risk of personal interest leading the fiduciary in a different
direction to the interests of beneficiaries was described as “the very evil against
which the rule in question is directed”). U.S. courts adopted the British approach
that fiduciaries must avoid self-interest conflicts. See, e.g., Michoud v. Girod, 45
U.S. 503, 555–56 (1846) (“The general rule stands upon our great moral
obligation to refrain from placing ourselves in relations which ordinarily excite a
conflict between self-interest and integrity. It restrains all agents, public and
private; but the value of the prohibition is most felt, and its application is more
frequent, in the private relations in which the vendor and purchaser may stand
towards each other.”); Farnam v. Brooks, 26 Mass. 212, 227 (1830) (“And first,
the plaintiff would clothe the defendant with the character of a trustee, over whose
transactions, in relation to the trust fund, courts of equity are particularly watchful,
because of the temptations trustees are under and the opportunities they have to
serve their own interest to the prejudice of the cestui que trust.”); Gardner v.
Ogden, 22 N.Y. 327, 350 (1860) (“[T]he disability extends to all persons who,
being employed or concerned in the affairs of another, acquired a knowledge of
his property.”).
101. J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 48 (1981).
102. MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE
PERFORMANCE OF NON-FIDUCIARY DUTIES 39 (2010).
103. Kenneth B. Davis, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decision-Making – Some
Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1985); John H. Langbein,
Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114
YALE L.J. 929 (2005); Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and
the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO L.J. 67 (2005).
104. Arthur R. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships,
54 AM. U. L. REV. 75 (2004); Matthew Conaglen, Fiduciary Regulation of
Conflicts Between Duties, 125 L.Q. REV. 111 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz,
Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1867 (2010).
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In this Section, we reflect on the legitimacy and value of state selfinterest—that is, decisions made by state actors with the intention of
producing resilience not only for citizen/beneficiaries and social
institutions, but also for the state itself. In making this claim, it is important
to distinguish the self-interest of the state as an enduring political entity
from the self-interest of the government of the day. While some may
believe that it would be normatively desirable for certain governments to
fail, it is reasonable to suggest, as a general proposition, that it is better if
democratic states do not fail. Of course, it is also highly unusual for states
to fail. As Weiss reminded us: “over the long run, most states have (with
some notable revolutionary exceptions) proved highly adaptive to
changing circumstances.” 105 Weiss argued that—notwithstanding the
popular trope of “state decline”—nation-state institutions retain
significant capacity and capability to govern and that the strength of these
domestic institutions critically determines economic success and political
stability. In rejecting the narrative of the decline of the nation-state, Weiss
argued that states are highly adaptive, generating resilience in response to
changing circumstances.
The idea of adaptiveness to changing circumstances is a central
component of resilience, as this concept has been developed in the context
of sustainability theory. “Resilience” is defined as the capacity of a system
to respond to and recover from shocks (sudden or extreme events) and
stresses (long-term trends that undermine the system) without changing its
basic state. 106 Resilient systems have the adaptive capacity to remain in a
functional state, 107 or to avoid tipping into an altered state, by maintaining
equilibrium in the face of challenges or crises. A related point can be made
about the resilience of the frames or paradigms that contain and constrain
state responses to property problems. The hinterland or nomos of property
norms shapes state responses to property crises. The property nomos in
each of the jurisdictions we examined comprised a complex hybrid of
norms, providing a range of latitude for different types of responses to
property problems. 108 This normative hybridity also supports adaptiveness
in moments of crisis, and this adaptiveness enables states, governments,
105. LINDA WEISS, THE MYTH OF THE POWERLESS STATE 9 (1998).
106. BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT, RESILIENCE THINKING: SUSTAINING
ECOSYSTEMS AND PEOPLE IN A CHANGING WORLD 123 (2006).
107. Jack Ahern, From Fail-Safe to Safe-to-Fail: Sustainability and Resilience
in the New Urban World (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Elsevier Editorial System for Landscape and Urban Planning); LAWRENCE VALE
& THOMAS CAMPANELLA, THE RESILIENT CITY: HOW MODERN CITIES RECOVER
FROM DISASTER (2005).
108. See supra Section.II.A.
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and property systems to be resilient: to recover and to avoid tipping into
an altered state. Hybridity supports flexibility, while the scaling of state
responses across the multi-layered institutions of the state enables states
to meet different resilience needs.
Sustainability theory examines cycles of resilience, continuity, and
change in natural systems. More recently, a significant body of scholarship
has drawn on its concepts to analyze resilience in social systems and
institutions—the “properties of a political system to cope, survive and
recover from complex challenges and crises that represent stresses or
pressures that can lead to a systemic failure.”109 Sisk’s account of
“democratic resilience” identified four characteristics of resilient social
systems: flexibility, recovery, adaptability, and innovation. He explained:
“Resilient social systems are flexible (able to absorb stress or pressure),
can recover from challenge or crises, adaptable (can change in response to
a stress to the system), and innovative (able to change in order to more
efficiently or effectively address the challenge or crisis).” 110
“Fragile” social systems—the opposite of resilient—are susceptible to
breakage or fracture because they do not have internal mechanisms to help
them cope, survive, and prosper when confronted with change, challenges,
or crises. As the resilience of liberal democratic states comes under
pressure 111 and post-liberal property systems face yet another (postpandemic) global crisis, the institutional resilience of the state—its
capacity to cope with changes, challenges, and crises without tipping into
a different state (for example, authoritarianism)—raises important and
urgent questions for property theorists. 112

109. TIMOTHY D. SISK, DEMOCRACY AND RESILIENCE: CONCEPTUAL
APPROACHES AND CONSIDERATIONS 5 (Andrew Mash ed., 2017).
110. Timothy Sisk, Democracy’s Resilience in a Changing World, in IDEA,
THE GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY: EXPLORING DEMOCRACY’S RESILIENCE 38
(2017).
111. The period since 2006 has been characterized as one of many crises in
democratic regimes. See id. (noting that the quality of democracy is declining in
many countries due to internal and external pressures). Diamond framed this as a
period of “democratic recession.” Larry Diamond, Facing up to the Democratic
Recession, 26 J. DEMOCRACY 141, 144 (2015).
112. The paradox of Anglo-American liberal property theories is that,
although private property is a central institution of the liberal state, it is necessarily
decentered or concealed in accounts of state action, and the enduring role of the
state in supporting and maintaining the system of private property is
systematically decentered or concealed in most liberal property scholarship.
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Van der Walt argued that the dynamic processes of stability and
change that produce adjustments within hybrid normative orders 113—the
processes through which legislation, judicial interpretation, and doctrinal
development shape and reshape the content of property law as it tracks
political movements over time—tend to be crowded out by the dominant
political mood in any given moment. The systemic importance of
normative pluralism is not fully reflected in the dominant, or “official,”
narratives of property law, which typically tell simplified stories about
property that elevate certainty over flexibility and predictability over
adaptiveness. These narratives have important implications for property
theory’s moral reasoning. Most notable, perhaps, as we reflect on the
importance of adaptiveness, flexibility, and innovation to maintain
equilibrium and enable recovery in times of crises, is the narrative that
locates the essence of property in the “property values” of stability,
certainty, predictability, and the protection of the status quo. 114 Van der
Walt described the dominant normative order—the orthodoxy—as
imposing an
113. See A.J. van der Walt, Resisting Orthodoxy – Again: Thoughts on the
Development of Post-Apartheid South African Law, 17 S. AFRICAN PUB. L. 259
(2002); see also A.J. van der Walt, Dancing with Codes – Protecting, Developing
and Deconstructing Property Rights in a Constitutional State, 118 S. AFRICAN
L.J. 258 (2001).
114. Van der Walt described the role of South African courts, developing the
common law following the enactment of the 1996 Constitution with its
commitment to transformation, as inherently conservative: “In the result, the
privileging of stability over change, security over novelty, and normality over
deviation appears as a fact of life, an unbearable force of inertia that resists all but
the most urgent and unmistakable impulses for change.” Furthermore, he argued,
faced with a choice between two or more interpretations, the chosen approach was
presented as a self-evident, logical necessity:
Courts do not only restrict the impact of the Constitution when they are
reticent or deliberately obstructive about change because they disagree
with the politics of transformation—as long as an interpretation is
available that preserves stability and certainty, courts often simply fail to
recognize the availability or the interpretive force of an alternative
interpretation that threatens those values, even though they might
acknowledge the need and justification for change in general. The
possibility of falling back on well-known, familiar and comfortable
solutions seems to have a destabilizing effect that prevents courts from
gathering the energy and the inspiration to recognize and support views
and approaches that promote transformation and reform but threaten
security and stability.
Van der Walt, supra note 113, at 268–69.
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established hierarchy . . . on law and meaning by the courts and
the state for the sake of clarity, certainty and predictability . . .
established and imposed, as Cover so compellingly argued,
through violent suppression of alternative views, alternative
meanings, alternative laws . . . [that] can only be established by
violently suppressing some of the energy and diversity that is at
work in a legal system. 115
That energy and diversity, plurality and hybridity—distributed across
scales of governance—enable property systems (and the states that
constitute, maintain, and rely on them) to resist and overcome institutional,
structural, or dogmatic inertia or polarization. It underpins the normative
orientation toward equilibrium.
Stability, like certainty, is a familiar trope in property law. It is often
interpreted as the avoidance of change116—a backward-looking
commitment to the status quo of property rights. The stability norm is
thought to “subdue uncertainty and flux and to improve stability and
security.” 117 It is characterized as politically neutral, self-evident common
sense: property law’s “settled reason” and the habits of the “common law
mind.”118 A range of standard positions justifies this approach, including
the need to ensure the security of long-term expectations, the reliability of
investment strategies, the rationality of decision-making about future land
use, the stability of forward planning, the need to protect titles taken by
purchasers and creditors, and so on. Property law’s stability bias is
sometimes articulated as an argument for the protection of settled
expectations on the grounds that to unsettle expectations would generate
“demoralization costs” by depleting owners’ confidence in the system of
property rights. 119 Davidson challenged this inference by arguing that the
property system is better served by prioritizing ex post flexibility over ex
ante certainty, orienting property rules to support all parties’ confidence

115. Id. at 271.
116. Underkuffler claimed that “property rights, by definition, assume the
existence of the legal status quo; they cannot, of themselves, answer the question
of when a change in that status quo is justified.” Underkuffler, supra note 21, at
337.
117. Van der Walt, supra note 113, at 270.
118. JOHN GREVILLE AGARD POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE
FEUDAL LAW 261–62 (1987).
119. Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214
(1967).
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that, over time, they will be treated fairly under a property regime that
“will ensure inclusion.”120
The scale of investment in the infrastructure and resources that support
dominant paradigms is high, so it is unsurprising that property law systems
are resilient to new paradigm thinking. However, the embeddedness of the
dominant paradigm at the systems level should not be confused with the
idea that specific property rules cannot, or should not, flex to adapt to
changing circumstances. 121 Rather, Resilient Property recognizes that it is
the very scope for adaptation that subsists within each jurisdiction’s
hybridized, multi-scalar property nomos that enables property systems to
respond to challenges and crises, and so to be resilient. It is this adaptive
resilience that enables property systems to dissipate the effects of shocks
that might otherwise create tipping points into new paradigms.
Resilient Property Theory offers an alternative conception of stability,
rooted in the normative desirability of avoiding tipping points:
maintaining legal, political, social, and economic equilibrium. Property
theory and property law are embedded in changing national, local, and
transnational contexts and in competing individual and institutional
demands for resilience. Maintaining equilibrium in a dynamic context,
through challenges and crises, requires adaptation, flexibility, innovation,
and “context-appropriate design”—sensitive to the nuances of the property
nomos in each jurisdiction.122 Legal resilience has been described as “the
ability of an Institutional Environment to absorb, by legal mechanisms of
resistance and recovery, unlawful practices, and also to adapt its legal
space rules to accommodate and retain, or to improve its legal
functionality vis-a-vis a new desired practice.” 123 The resilience of legal
systems and property systems depends on being able to adapt, to flex, and

120. Nestor M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 437 (2011)
(emphasis omitted).
121. However, we also recognize the powerful political influence of vested
“insider” property interests in fixing specific property rules in place or evolving
rules to better protect property insiders. O’Mahony, supra note 50.
122. Sisk argued that “Democratic institutions can be designed for resilience,
but there are no simple solutions and designs must be adapted to local realities.
With context-appropriate design, it may be possible to craft institutions that are
more resilient when they are tested by political, economic or social strains and
pressures.” SISK, DEMOCRACY AND RESILIENCE, supra note 109, at 1.
123. Michiel Heldeweg, Normative Alignment, Institutional Resilience and
Shifts in Legal Governance of the Energy Transition, 9 SUSTAINABILITY 1, 4
(2017).
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to innovate in the face of unprecedented and unexpected challenges and
change. 124
Resilient Property draws on equilibrium theory to understand how
resilience is produced, for states and for individuals. Equilibrium theory
defines “resilience” as the capacity of a system to respond to, rebound, or
recover from, shocks (sudden or extreme events; tipping points) and
stresses (long-term trends that undermine the system) without changing its
basic state. Identifying alignments between the resilience needs of
governments and the state’s other-regarding role in allocating resilience,
it reveals the complex drivers of property outcomes, as these affect
individuals and communities, as well as social and economic institutions.
Finally, in focusing attention on the realities of property policy, it
identifies realistic spaces for property advocacy.
In Part III, we reflect on the property crises we are currently
collectively facing across the world: the impact and aftermath of the global
coronavirus pandemic. Applying the lens of our Resilient Property
Theory, we examine the emergency measures adopted by several
governments as the pandemic threatened the health and wellbeing of
citizens on a scale that was unprecedented for most of our lifetimes. As
stay-in-place orders, including the provision of emergency shelter for
unhoused or precariously housed people, collided with an upsurge in
vacant commercial buildings and stalled development projects, the perfect
property storm of homelessness, squatting, and empty buildings and land
was brought into fresh relief. Through a Resilient Property lens, state
responses to property problems in the pandemic reveal the resilience needs
that confronted states during the crisis and the actions they took to
124. Arnold and Gunderson argued that when legal systems favor monocentric
and unimodal methods and linear processes they are maladaptive and ill-suited to
resolving emerging challenges. Craig Anthony Arnold & Lance H. Gunderson,
Adaptive Law and Resilience, 43 ENV’T L. REP. 10426 (2013). Their approach—
which they termed “adaptive law”—focuses on how structure emerges out of
nested cycles of adaptation and change. Echoing the methods of wicked problem
theory, they proposed that legal frameworks should be developed in ways that
mimic the resilience and adaptive capabilities of ecological and social systems:
(1) adaptive goals that aim for multiple forms of resilience; (2) an adaptive system
structure that is polycentric, multimodal, and multi-scalar; (3) methods of
adaptation and context-regarding flexibility; and (4) iterative processes with
feedback loops and accountability mechanisms. This also echoes a central premise
of Peñalver and Katyal’s Property Outlaws, in which they proposed that the
behaviors of property rule-breakers provide a necessary impetus to change, that
increases the resilience of the institution of private property. See EDUARDO
MOISES PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS,
PIRATES AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP (2010).
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maintain and restore equilibrium through the shockwaves of the pandemic
and its aftermath.
III. FRAMING THE PANDEMIC: STATE RESPONSES
Bacchi argued that when we frame policy interventions as straightforwardly rational responses to objective social or economic problems, we
risk oversimplifying the policy-making process. Rather, she argued, we
should understand the orientation of policy initiatives as a consequence of
how those problems are framed, understood, and described: of how they
are “represented.” 125 This process of representation has been profoundly
affected by the imperatives of the coronavirus pandemic as the delivery
and sustainability of housing became a vector of contestation. 126 Indeed,
as Rogers and Powers observed, COVID-19 foregrounded “experiences of
home, . . . our capacities to pay for housing, and more.” 127 Reflecting on
the dramatic reframing of homelessness and precarious housing in
Australia, Parsell and his co-authors described these reframed
representations as opening up new spaces of political possibility. 128 The
distinction between pre-pandemic representations of homelessness and the
steps that states implemented to “bring everyone in” was underpinned by
an important narrative shift. Before the pandemic, representations of
homelessness, and homeless people, in Australia and elsewhere were
“[i]nformed by prevailing neoliberal rationalities . . . represented as a
problem of defective individuals who require tailored support to address
problematic behaviours and personal pathologies.”129 However, from
early in the pandemic period, representations of homelessness as a matter
of individual personal responsibility—and failure—were overtaken by
representations framed by collective public health.

125. CAROL LEE BACCHI, POLICY ANALYSIS: WHAT IS THE PROBLEM
REPRESENTED TO BE? (2009).
126. Dallas Rogers & Emma Powers, Housing Policy and the Covid-19
Pandemic: The Importance of Housing Research During this Health Emergency,
20 INT’L J. HOUS. POL’Y 177, 178 (2020).
127. Id. at 177–78.
128. Cameron Parsell et al., Understanding Responses to Homelessness
During Covid-19: An Examination of Australia, HOUS. STUD. 1, 4 (2020). They
observed that the new political framing of homelessness had been “shaped by
prevailing political rationalities, whose assumptions, categories and aetiological
logics set the conditions of possibility for exercising political power in particular
times and places.”
129. Id. at 1.
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The reframing of homelessness as a public-health emergency focused
policy attention on urgent state action to bring homeless people into
sheltered accommodation. It generated a political imperative for states to
act, 130 providing the political cover for measures that, in a pre-pandemic
context, would have been considered to be outside the window of
discourse for politically viable policies—the “Overton window.”131
Overton argued that policy options can be understood along a spectrum—
from the unthinkable, radical, and unacceptable, to those that are
considered sensible but not yet popular—with those policies that come
within the Overton window (popular ideas or current policy) defined as
the realm of the “politically possible.” The window is determined by
public opinion and, according to the theory, feeds into the political
calculus through which politicians decide which policies are worth
pursuing. In most cases, it is argued, only policy choices that fall within
the window of the politically possible are likely to be successful or garner
support from the electorate. Political leaders respond to signals that help
them identify where their Overton windows lie, in the context of the policy
challenges that governments face.
The majority of U.S. states responding to the pandemic deployed
“innovative property policy” initiatives. These included the provision of
(a) fiscal support in the form of relief and welfare payments, and initiatives
such as furlough to keep people in employment; (b) bringing homeless
people into shelter; and (c) eviction bans to safeguard the precariously
130. The framing of the problem as an emergency elicited convenient fictions
that animated political responses. As noted by Jacob Remes and Andy Horowitz,
“disasters are interpretive fictions” because they are predicated on particularized
vulnerabilities and risk experienced in a social setting. JACOB REMES & ANDY
HOROWITZ, CRITICAL DISASTER STUDIES 2 (2021). Indeed, as Remes and
Horowitz argue, there is no real “disaster,” but rather events that expose the
differing levels of resilience that emerge in political, social, and economic
contexts. See id. To this end, they argue, disasters are not inevitable but rather are
“bound up in human history, shaped by human action and inaction.” Id. As we
have argued in the context of property and the state, understanding why the state
deploys resilience for some actors and not for others is essential to assessing how
property systems operate, how legal scholars interact with those systems, and how
outcomes of resilience can be fostered—if not through property, in other
institutions of the state.
131. The idea of an “Overton window” (named for policy analyst Joseph
Overton) refers to public perceptions of policy ideas. Policy ideas that are within
the Overton window are considered to be within the range of acceptable policy
ideas. See A Brief Explanation of The Overton Window, MACKINAC CTR. FOR
PUBLIC POL’Y, https://www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow [https://perma.cc/
PUU9-3RUD] (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
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housed from landlord or mortgagor eviction actions that would have left
them without shelter. While the details varied, the common footprint of
these responses signals the role of housing resilience in shoring up the
resilience of each of the five jurisdictions we have explored in this
Article. 132
A. Fiscal Support: Emergency Relief
Although the individuals leading the U.S. Federal Government were
initially reluctant to provide fiscal relief, by mid-May 2020, a shift in the
U.S. policy response was beginning to emerge. As families who lost jobs
and wages struggled to pay for food, mortgages, rent, and other basic
needs, concerns were raised about the economic impacts of prolonged
lockdowns, the pandemic was reframed as both a public-health crisis and
an economic crisis. On May 23, 2020, former U.S. President Donald
Trump, lamenting the economic impact of global shutdowns, famously
quipped, “WE CANNOT LET THE CURE BE WORSE THAN THE
DISEASE.”133 At the same time, the scale of the economic threat led many
governments and central banks to intervene with unprecedented
emergency measures to help people in financial difficulty. In the U.K., the
Conservative Government, the party that implemented “austerity”
measures in response to the 2008 financial crisis, announced a £330 billion
package of emergency loan guarantees to help people in financial
difficulties 134 and pledged a further £20 billion of fiscal support for U.K.
132. One vector that demonstrated the common problem amongst states was
the role that social networks play in communicating the disease and
communicating information about the disease. These social networks spread
across state lines, linking countries in both the challenges of addressing the
pandemic as well as communicating responses to the pandemic. As one group of
researchers studying the impact of social networks on the disease concluded,
“[c]ountries had the opportunity of learning from others about social adjustments
that were more or less effective in containing the disease.” See Fabio Milani,
Covid-19 Outbreak, Social Response, and Early Economic Effects: A Global VAR
Analysis of Cross-Country Interdependencies, 34 J. POPUL. ECON. 223, 226
(2020).
133. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 22, 2020) (no
longer available), reprinted in Maggie Haberman & David E. Sanger, Trump Says
Coronavirus Cure Cannot ‘Be Worse Than the Problem Itself,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/politics/trump-coronavirusrestrictions.html [https://perma.cc/7MLX-XDT4].
134. Measures implemented in the U.K. included a job retention (furlough)
scheme; deferring VAT and income tax payments; and a statutory sick-pay relief
package for small- and medium-sized businesses. England to support enterprises;
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businesses. In the U.S., the Federal Reserve announced a $300 billion
lending program to support Main Street businesses, and the Trump
administration secured a $2 trillion “virus-aid package,” the CARES Act,
to support the economy and shore up financially vulnerable households. 135
This package included an initial ban on foreclosures of federally backed
mortgages and a ban on evictions of tenants in federal housing programs
for four months, as well as food assistance, healthcare assistance, and a
range of loans, loan guarantees, and relief schemes.
Similarly, in May 2020, the South African government announced a
$26 billion (10% of GDP), three-phase program of financial-assistance
measures, including measures to support and rescue businesses (phase 1);
social relief and economic support (phase 2), including direct support to
households and individuals for the relief of hunger, social distress, and job
protection by supporting workers’ wages; and an economic recovery
package (phase 3). 136 In Ireland, the government provided a “COVID-19
Pandemic Unemployment Payment”—a state-funded emergency aid
program to provide financial relief for employed and self-employed people
who were unable to work due to the pandemic. 137 An initial commitment
to fund this payment for six weeks from March 2020 was extended until
April 2021. 138 In July 2020, the Irish government announced a €7.4 billion
a 12-month business rates holiday for all retail, hospitality, leisure, and nursery
businesses in England; grant funding for small businesses and for retail,
hospitality, and leisure businesses; a business-interruption loan scheme, and a
lending facility from the Bank of liquidity for larger businesses. Andrew
Woodcock & Lizzy Buchan, Coronavirus: Chancellor announces £330bn in
government-backed loans to help businesses, INDEP. (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/coronavirus-chancellor-govern
ment-loan-business-economy-rishi-sunak-a9407381.html [https://perma.cc/ZN6
G-6KDW].
135. Jenna Smialek, The Fed Goes All in with Unlimited Bond-Buying Plan,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/business/
economy/coronavirus-fed-bond-buying.html [https://perma.cc/P6Y3-ULJ5].
136. This $26 billion financial-assistance measure constituted 10% of the
country’s GDP. Judd Devermont & Topaz Mukulu, South Africa’s Bold Response
to the Covid-19 Pandemic, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (May 12,
2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-africas-bold-response-covid-19-pan
demic [https://perma.cc/P2QJ-DU9G].
137. COVID-19 Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP), CITIZENS INFO.,
https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/social_welfare/social_welfare_payments/
unemployed_people/covid19_pandemic_unemployment_payment.html [https://
perma.cc/84M7-ZQQM] (last updated Feb. 28, 2022).
138. Gemma Tetlow et al., Coronavirus: How Different Countries Supported
the Unemployed, INST. FOR GOV’T (Jan. 10, 2022), https://www.institutefor
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stimulus package to boost economic recovery. 139 And in June 2020, as
national and global economies shrank rapidly and many millions lost their
jobs, the Spanish government launched what has been described as “the
world’s biggest economics experiment”: 140 a universal-basic-income
program intended to help the poorest households meet basic financial
needs and avoid becoming trapped in poverty. 141 Spain also redirected
€150 million of EU Cohesion Policy funding to strengthen the healthcare
sector as part of a national pandemic response that included a €2.5 billion
European Regional Development Fund investment to support health
services and businesses in mitigating the consequences of the pandemic.142
Although governments in each of these countries redeployed state
resources to bolster the resilience of the workforce, neither the impact nor
the outcome was uniform. The U.S. experienced record unemployment
claims, triggering record unemployment-insurance claims by individuals.
States with more structured social-protection regimes pre-pandemic
experienced a less drastic reduction in employment and were able to tailor
their economic support programs toward other forms of resilience. In
Spain, the deployment of Universal Basic Income (UBI) was a response
to both pre-pandemic economic conditions and the depletion of state and
social resilience in the pandemic crisis. UBI seeks to provide citizens with
a “social protection floor,” guaranteeing to each citizen a basic level of
income security. 143 Ortiz and his co-authors claimed that UBI is designed
to allow people “breathing space to engage in meaningful and decent work
government.org.uk/explainers/coronavirus-unemployment-support [https://perma
.cc/D8SE-FYGT].
139. GOV’T OF IR., DEPARTMENT OF THE TAOISEACH, ECONOMIC RECOVERY
PLAN (2021).
140. Carrie Arnold, Pandemic Speeds Major Test of Universal Basic Income,
NATURE (July 10, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01993-3
[https://perma.cc/6NRU-DBZ4].
141. Germany is trialing a similar scheme, although on a much smaller scale.
Adam Payne, Germany Is Set to Trial a Universal Basic Income Scheme, WORLD
ECON. FORUM (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/08/
germany-universal-basic-income-trial-citizens/ [https://perma.cc/J8JL-HZJP].
142. Coronavirus Response €150 Million of Cohesion Policy Funding
Reprogrammed to Mitigate the Social Impact of the Pandemic in Spain,
EUROPEAN COMM’N (Nov. 8, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/new
sroom/news/2020/08/08-11-2020-coronavirus-response-eur150-million-of-cohes
ion-policy-funding-reprogrammed-to-mitigate-the-social-impact-of-the-pandem
ic-in-spain [https://perma.cc/PAX4-2FUM].
143. Graham Perkins et al., Analysing the Impacts of Universal Basic Income
in the Changing World of Work: Challenges to the Psychological Contract and a
Future Research Agenda, 2021 HUM. RESOUR. MANAG. J. 1, 3 (2021).
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and care for their families” or others in their community. 144 UBI is also
associated with empowering women who provide unpaid labor in the
home and providing financial headroom for women to leave abusive
relationships.
The novel coronavirus pandemic raised fresh interest in UBI policies,
as governments around the world implemented radical policies to provide
economic assistance during the crisis. In Spain, UBI has been a policy
objective for progressive social movements including PAH (Platforma de
Afectados por la Hipoteca) (Platform for People Affected by Mortgages)
and the Indignados Movement (associated with Spain’s anti-austerity
platforms and demonstrations)145 since the 2008 housing crisis. Between
2011 and 2016, Spain launched four UBI pilot programs. 146 In 2016, the
most recent pilot, B-Mincome, was launched by the City of Barcelona. BMincome was a pilot program to study the effects of UBI on three local
neighborhoods. The city program provided between €100 and €1,676 per
month per household for 644 randomly selected residents. 147 In 2015, the
former leader of PAH Ada Colau was elected mayor on a platform of
prioritizing social change; addressing poverty, including housing
insecurity; and tackling income inequality. 148 Indignados member Carlos
Declós described UBI as a leading legislative priority for PAH, whose
tactics since 2013 have included advocacy for housing affordability, as
well as political squatting to highlight the urgent need for affordable
housing. 149
144. Isabel Ortiz et al., Universal Basic Income Proposals in Light of ILO
Standards: Key Issues and Global Costing 5 (Extension of Social Security, ESS
Working Paper No. 62, 2018).
145. PHILLIPE VAN PARIJS & YANNICK YANDERBOUGHT, BASIC INCOME: A
RADICAL PROPOSAL FOR A FREE SOCIETY AND A SANE ECONOMY 192 (2017)
(noting that the Radical Left party emerged from the Indignados movement
associated with M-11 associated with anti-austerity policies, including Universal
Basic Income).
146. Laura Colini, The B-MINCOME Project Journal N°1, THE URBAN LAB
OF EUROPE (Dec. 2017), https://www.uia-initiative.eu/sites/default/files/201712/FINAL%20VERSION_Barcelona.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9FB-VHRX]. The
four programs are Programa De recualificación professional de las personas que
agoten la protección por desempleo (2011), Prepara (2011), and Programa
Extraordinario de Activación para el empleo PAE (2015). B-Mincome was
launched by the City of Barcelona in 2016.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 10.
149. In March 2019, the Young Foundation published a report titled Getting
by in Barcelona: A Portrait of Life Before Basic Income, depicting how incometo-housing gaps prompted by high unemployment and evictions since the 2008
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The background and success of Barcelona’s B-Income Program, along
with the heightened insecurity brought on by the pandemic, opened a
policy window for the much broader adoption of UBI nationwide. As the
lack of economic resilience amongst Spain’s large population of
temporary workers posed a major threat to the economic and social
stability of the country, the state deployed UBI protections on a national
scale. The national UBI plan is a means-tested regimen aimed at shoring
up the resilience gap generated by extreme income disparity. Qualifying
recipients receive between €462 and €1,015 per month. 150 Recognizing
that many workers in Spain work temporarily, the UBI plan excluded
short-term work in the income-means test for determining eligibility. The
plan was also designed to be responsive to changing economic needs, and
legislators took the opportunity to address the particular economic and
housing precarities experienced by women and girls by waiving preexisting conditions that typically disadvantage on the basis of gender. 151
One question that has been raised in the context of these initiatives is
how states will offset new, unexpected expenditures brought on by the
pandemic. In the U.K., Treasury reported a deficit of £337 billion, making
up 15% of the total U.K. GDP. 152 Likewise, in Spain, where the prepandemic economy relied heavily on outside tourism, the economic
impact of the pandemic has been severe. In the U.S., state and local
governments feared massive tax shortfalls as normally reliable sales tax
revenues flattened in 2020, reflecting lower consumer demand. 153 U.S.
state and local governments expected to counter the shortfalls through
federal infrastructure funding, which aimed to bridge the spending gap
housing crisis had led to Spain having the “highest income inequality of any
country in Europe.” Amanda Hill Dixon et al., Getting by in Barcelona: A Portrait
of Life Before Basic Income, REPORT OF YOUNG FOUND. 8 (Mar. 2019),
https://www.youngfoundation.org/publications/getting-by-in-barcelona/ [https://
perma.cc/P58E-SERQ]; see Colini, supra note 146.
150. Jennifer Waidler & Maja Gavrilovic, From Crisis Comes Opportunity:
Spain’s Basic Income Response to COVID-19, UNICEF CONNECT (July 1, 2020),
https://blogs.unicef.org/evidence-for-action/from-crisis-comes-opportunity-spain
s-basic-income-response-to-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/SZ7U-3NSW].
151. Id.
152. Brian Peccarelli, What UK Taxes Could Be Raised to Cover Covid-driven
Spending?, INT’L TAX REV. (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.internationaltaxreview
.com/article/b1n0qc7y0cttlh/what-uk-taxes-could-be-raised-to-cover-covid-drive
n-spending [https://perma.cc/R9DS-5HZV].
153. Heather Gillers & Peter Santilli, States Expected Covid-19 to Bring
Widespread Tax Shortfalls. It Didn’t Happen., WALL STREET J. (Mar. 10, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-expected-covid-19-to-bring-widespread-taxshortfalls-it-didnt-happen-11615372201 [https://perma.cc/KB4Z-LWLZ].
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through a series of redirections, reclamations, and delays on other
spending priorities. 154 In Argentina, the already cash-strapped government
passed a one-time tax levy of up to 2% on its wealthiest citizens
(approximately 12,000 people), raising $3 billion to offset new costs
associated with social distancing and social safety-net enhancements
during the pandemic. In the short-term, governments have largely borne
the fiscal costs of the pandemic, relying on forecasted future economic
growth to generate tax revenue that is hypothecated to fund current
endeavors. This “tax increment financing” strategy presumes that the
future taxes collected on current investments will outpace the deficits over
time. 155 These strategies are often financialized through the bond market,
where private investors lend money to the government at a fixed rate to
enable the government to meet urgent spending demands. These
dependencies on economic growth and private investment to shore up the
fiscal resilience of states will impact on the background resilience of
governments as states continue to adapt their strategies for mediating the
immediate public-health threats of the pandemic and laying the
foundations for economic recovery.
B. Bringing Homeless People into Shelter
The global shutdown and urgent shelter-in-place directives reframed
political concepts of risk in relation to homeless populations and the
precariously housed. Homelessness scholars and advocates have long
argued that applying criminal justice or public order frames to
154. Nicole Goodkind, Explainer: What’s in the $1.2 Trillion Infrastructure
Bill?, FORTUNE (July 29, 2021), https://fortune.com/2021/07/29/explainer-in
frastructure-bill-biden-congress-roads-bridges-clean-energy-railroads-public-trans
portation-internet-water-cybersecurity-airports-pollution-ports-evs-safe-streets/
[https://perma.cc/LH87-9JPT].
155. Mark Sandford & Kevin Muldoon-Smith, Covid-19 Has Emphasized the
Importance of the Local State – but How to Solve a Problem like Local
Government Funding?, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. & POL. SCI. (May 7, 2020),
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/local-government-funding/ [https://perm
a.cc/63ZY-RE5Y]. The national debt or deficit spending has often been maligned
as irresponsible fiscal policy in austerity-promoting analysis. These views often
draw on folksy common-sense rationales rather than on data, which suggests that
deficit spending as a product of economic opportunity fuels economic growth
rather than limits it. See James Clingermayer & B. Dan Wood, Disentangling
Patterns of State Debt Financing, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 108 (1995); Phillip
Coggan, Does Government Debt Matter Anymore?, PROSPECT (May 3, 2021),
https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/does-government-debt-matterany-more-austerity-deficit-spending-borrowing [https://perma.cc/2NNE-5HVR].
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homelessness—for example, regulating to punish homeless persons for
sleeping in public spaces—fails to address the causes of homelessness.
The embodiment of the human condition means that, inherently and
unavoidably, everyone needs to “be” somewhere. As such, responses to
homelessness based on deterrence measures that do not also provide
alternative shelter solutions are simply ineffective: they are seeking to
“move along” people who have nowhere else to go. 156 The rapid responses
of governments that, faced with the public-health crisis of the pandemic,
intervened with funded initiatives to bring homeless people into shelter
signaled that—notwithstanding homelessness policies that were notionally
framed around deterrence and choice—the “no-choice” nature of
homelessness is fundamentally understood and accepted by policymakers. As cities and states grappled with the imperatives of enforcing
shelter-at-home directives, punitive policies toward homeless people157
gave way to the more urgent narrative of public health.
In the short term, some states took unprecedented steps to house
homeless populations: providing rooms in vacant hotels, 158 converting
empty buildings into temporary accommodations, 159 repurposing ghost
towns to house homeless people, 160 and in some local areas, reinvigorating
“housing first” plans to put homeless people in stable housing so that they
could shelter in place with sufficient social-distancing measures. 161 In
156. TIMOTHY MULVANEY & JOSEPH SINGER, Move Along to Where?
Property in Service of Democracy: A Tribute to André van der Walt, in G MULLER
ET AL., TRANSFORMATIVE PROPERTY LAW, FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF ANDREW
VAN DER WALT 1 (2018).
157. See Marc Roark, Homelessness at the Cathedral, 80 MO. L. REV. 53, 128
(2015); Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and Community, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 371
(2000).
158. Alicia Victoria Lozano, California fast-tracks plans to house homeless
residents amid Covid-19 outbreak, NBC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/california-fast-tracks-plans-househomeless-residents-amid-covid-19-n1179656 [https://perma.cc/58GA-8TLP].
159. Regions shelter homeless during coronavirus lockdown, PROGRESSIVE
SPAIN (Mar. 24, 2020), http://progressivespain.com/2020/03/24/regions-shelterhomeless-during-coronavirus-lockdown/ [https://perma.cc/RFR8-4ZVE].
160. Juan Carlos De Santos Pascual, Spain’s homeless help repopulate rural
ghost towns, EURONEWS (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.euronews.com/2020/12/
30/spain-s-homeless-help-repopulate-rural-ghost-towns [https://perma.cc/6EZXFP83].
161. One group known as WINNYC revealed in May 2020 its Aftermath Plan:
Responding to Homelessness in the Wake of Covid-19. The plan urged city, state,
and federal government to reinvest in housing resources that enabled precariously
housed persons to remain housed during moments of crisis, target and identify
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some places, state agencies took stock of empty properties or places that
had the potential to be empty (such as office spaces that were temporarily
abandoned in the pandemic), leveraging state resources to provide shelter
for “at risk” populations. In what was perhaps the most notable extension
of the Overton window, governments commandeered empty buildings to
bring homeless people off the streets and into safer environments.162 In
Ireland, temporarily empty hotels were block-booked and a large number
of Airbnb accommodations—left empty as travel and tourism ceased—
were leased by government-commissioned organizations to house
homeless people. In England, the government-funded “Everyone In”
initiative, block-booked empty hotels to house rough sleepers 163 in the
initial months of the pandemic. News media reported that for one hotel in
Manchester, about half of the homeless people who had stayed there under
the Everyone In initiative had been moved on to other accommodation,
usually supported housing or temporary accommodation.
Initiatives to shelter homeless people were generally delivered
through local authorities, under the political cover—enabled through
allocations of funding and powers to act—of central or national
governments. Central governments allocated political and economic
resilience to local authorities, who provided front-line responses to the
urgent local challenges of street homelessness during periods of lockdown.
As with many aspects of initial state responses to the pandemic, there were
significant local variations in the nature, extent, and impact of these
initiatives. In England, the Local Government Association—the national
membership body for local authorities—commissioned a rapid report to
families who have lost homes to find new housing resources and develop new
affordable housing measures to combat the increase in homelessness. See The
Aftermath Plan: Responding to Homelessness in the Wake of Covid-19, WINNYC
(May 2020), https://winnyc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/final-5.8_TheAftermath-of-COVID-19-Preparing-for-and-Responding-to-Housing-Instability
v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6WP-F788].
162. See, e.g., Parsell et al., supra note 128; How States are Housing the
Homeless During a Pandemic, ASTHO EXPERTS BLOG (Nov. 10, 2021), https://
www.astho.org/StatePublicHealth/How-States-are-Housing-the-Homeless-During
-a-Pandemic/05-20-20/ [https://perma.cc/PNT5-MJVU].
163. Rough sleepers are a type of homeless persons who primarily live on the
streets or are unsheltered. In the U.K., homeless persons include any precariously
housed person who lacks security of tenure in their shelter arrangements.
Homeless reflects the idea that individuals are unable to effectively establish
communal ties normally enveloped in the concept of “home” due to the temporary
or unstable nature of their living arrangements. See Kate Moss & Paramjit Singh,
A European Perspective on Women’s Rough Sleeping, in WOMEN ROUGH
SLEEPERS IN EUROPE 45 (2015).
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identify lessons learned from the Everyone In response to the COVID-19
crisis, across 343 local authorities, to inform future policies and practices
to tackle rough sleeping and those at risk of it and to inform planning for
winter 2020–21. 164 The report concluded that “[t]he success of Everyone
In demonstrates that, given the mandate and funding, councils, working
with their partners, have the means to end the vast majority of rough
sleeping.” 165
This report identified key factors of success—including the
importance of the commitments that governments made to delivering a
rapid and expansive response, targeted at rough sleepers and people living
in unsafe conditions who were at risk of sleeping rough. Crucially, in
England the initiative extended to include people who were not normally
eligible for public services due to their immigration status. This can be
contrasted with debates in the U.S., which continued to reference
exclusionary tropes, such as whether non-citizens were entitled to state
assistance. 166 For the Everyone In initiative, and through the lens of public
health, the identity of the homeless person did not determine the offer of
shelter and support. Other features of local schemes that were seen to have
worked well in England included comprehensive needs assessment,
including health, substance abuse, and the specific needs of women; the
use of hotel accommodation, giving homeless people important feelings
of safety and self-worth; the presence of multi-agency services in the
emergency accommodation, encouraging engagement with services; and
rapid turnaround in “moving on” the low-needs cohort. Where the
initiative worked well, multi-agency partnership—across health, criminal
justice, housing associations, and the voluntary and charitable sectors—
was a key enabler. The report found that this led to a better understanding
between partners about what they each could do and revealed potential to
bring together and allocate their respective resources in new ways.
164. Lessons Learnt from Councils’ Response to Rough Sleeping During the
Covid-19 Pandemic, LOC. GOV’T ASS’N (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.local.gov
.uk/publications/lessons-learnt-councils-response-rough-sleeping-during-covid-19pandemic [https://perma.cc/3G6U-2S5L] [hereinafter Lessons Learnt].
165. Id.
166. Felicia J. Persaud, The Public Charge Rule and Covid 19, THE N.Y.
AMSTERDAM NEWS 14 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://amsterdamnews.com/news/
2020/03/19/public-charge-rule-and-covid-19/
[https://perma.cc/E56R-J9GT]
(criticizing the failure of states and the Trump administration to specifically tailor
messages to non-citizens, both documented and undocumented for how to access
public services during the pandemic); Hatice Dilek et al., The Impact of Covid-19
on Ethnicity, Minorities and Immigrants: Are We All in the Same Ship?, 42
CUMHURIYET MED. J. 236 (2020).
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Where it worked well, the initiative also strengthened resilience
between levels of government and across state agencies. The LGA report
highlighted the positive impact of enhanced trust between councils
operating across two-tier geographies—where counties and districts with
interdependent responsibilities had worked together both vertically and
horizontally to secure the best outcomes. By utilizing the opportunities of
new technologies to adopt new ways of working—for example,
conducting remote meetings between agencies—the state' bolstered its
capacity to meet the challenge of bringing homeless people into shelters.
In a study published in The Lancet, Lewer and his co-authors found that
although an estimated 24 homeless people had died due to SARS-CoC-2
by May 31, 2020, preventative policies implemented in the U.K. to protect
the homeless population during the first wave of COVID-19 (between
February and May 2020) were likely to have very significantly reduced
the rate of infection for this population, preventing 21,092 infections, 266
deaths, 1,164 hospital admissions, and 338 ICU admissions. 167
A major concern—with respect to much of this emergency
provision—was what would happen once the initial funding ran out.168
Like many other aspects of the state’s response to the uncertainties of the
pandemic, the time horizon of emergency policies continually shifted as
the pandemic progressed. This created a “stop-start” dynamic, with
piecemeal policy updates routinely extended for a few months more as the
expected end-date approached. In the U.K., the government indicated that
by June 2020, local authorities had accommodated 14,610 people,
although a significant proportion of these were not rough sleepers before
the pandemic: some were brought into accommodation to enable greater
social distancing than shelters or hostels could afford, and others to
prevent them from becoming rough sleepers. The U.K.’s central
government allocated £3.2 billion to local authorities to allow them to
meet local needs during the pandemic, including protecting the most
vulnerable such as rough sleepers. In June 2020, the government
167. Dan Lewer et al., COVID-19 among people experiencing homelessness
in England: a modelling study, 8 LANCET RESPIRATORY MED. 1181, 1181 (2020).
One report claimed that in Paris, where state responses were seen as less effective,
40% of the homeless population was infected. Homelessness and COVID: High
Infection Rates and Social Marginalisation Haunts Paris’ Homeless, EURONEWS
(Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.euronews.com/2021/02/03/homelessness-and-covidhigh-infection-rates-and-social-marginalisation-haunts-paris-homele
[https://perma.cc/H2SA-U2H5].
168. Aisling Reidy, Homeless Figures and the Impact of Covid-19, FOCUS IR.,
https://www.focusireland.ie/homeless-figures-and-the-impact-of-covid-19/
[https://perma.cc/3K4U-MY24] (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
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announced an £85 million fund to provide emergency accommodation for
5,400 rough sleepers to avoid them having to return the streets when hotels
reopened for business. 169 It also committed another £433 million “to
provide 6,000 long-term, safe homes to support thousands of rough
sleepers currently housed in emergency accommodation [to] move on to
more sustainable accommodation.”170 And in December 2020, the U.K.
government pledged a further £310 million to local authorities for 2021,
targeted at areas with high numbers of homeless people and those at risk
of homelessness or living in temporary accommodation. This was pitched
as a £47 million increase on the 2020 budget for this part of the initiative
and was described as part of an overall investment of more than £750
million to tackle homelessness and rough sleeping in 2021. By the end of
2020, the government claimed to have helped more than 29,000 vulnerable
people, with two-thirds of these people having moved on to settled
accommodation. 171
It is important to recognize that these emergency investments to tackle
homelessness came on the heels of a decade of austerity. A report
published in February 2020 highlighted increased demand for
homelessness services over the last decade, in a context of austerity-era

169. Amelia Gentleman, Treasury Announces £85m for Rough Sleeper
Accommodation, GUARDIAN (June 24, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/
society/2020/jun/24/treasury-announces-85m-for-rough-sleeper-accommodation
[https://perma.cc/NA29-5CCM].
170. Luke Hall, Rough Sleeping: COVID-19 Response, UIN HCWS263 (June
3, 2020), https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/
2020-06-03/HCWS263 [https://perma.cc/L2CA-K4JL]; see also SUZANNE
FITZPATRICK ET AL., THE COVID-19 CRISIS RESPONSE TO HOMELESSNESS IN
GREAT BRITAIN (2020).
171. Government Pledges Further £310 Million to Tackle Homelessness,
GOV.UK (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/governmentpledges-further-310-million-to-tackle-homelessness
[https://perma.cc/3D6V42QE]. An evaluation of responses to homelessness and rough sleeping during
the pandemic, published by the London School of Economics, noted that—as is
often the case in relation to official data on homelessness—the statistics published
by the government may not have presented a wholly accurate picture. For
example, the count of homeless people supported may have been skewed where
people left emergency shelters voluntarily, and then re-presented (perhaps
multiple times); and they included an unknown proportion of people who were
already “in the system.” Christine Whitehead et al., Homelessness and Rough
Sleeping in the Time of COVID-19, TRUST FOR LONDON (May 5, 2021),
https://www.trustforlondon.org.uk/publications/homelessness-and-roughsleeping-in-the-time-of-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/7784-G46Z].
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cuts to local authority budgets. 172 The Homelessness Reduction Act 2017
expanded local authorities’ legal duties for households that are homeless
or at risk of homelessness, widening the pool of people entitled to receive
support from local authorities in relation to their homelessness. However,
the report found that in the period immediately preceding the pandemic,
local authority expenditure on homelessness-related services was
significantly lower than it had been a decade previously. It argued that if
local authorities were going to meet the government’s manifesto
commitment to end rough sleeping by 2024, they would require sufficient
funding and an assurance that future funding would be guaranteed in the
long term, as well as clear direction to ensure that funding was focused on
homelessness and not diverted to other local priorities.
Although many governments responded by bringing homeless people
into shelter in response to the pandemic, the approaches adopted in
specific initiatives varied depending on the jurisdiction—with a range of
approaches and degrees of success both between and within nation-states.
In the U.S., there was no national initiative to bring the homeless into
shelters, and there was significant variation in approaches as states, cities,
and local authorities experimented with different policy options. 173 This
reflects the different scales of response that can be undertaken in the U.S.,
by local municipalities versus federal or regional authorities. Many cities
and states across the U.S. took extraordinary measures to get homeless
persons off the streets and into viable housing. One homeless advocate in
San Francisco observed that the pandemic had revealed the depth of
inequalities between those who are sheltered and those who are not: “The
very visual impact of wealth disparity that homelessness brings to the table
has [been magnified] because we’re talking about municipal governments
asking everyone to shelter in place and they have thousands of people
without an ability to shelter in place.” 174

172. Matthew Oakley & Christina Bovill Rose, Local Authority Spending on
Homelessness: 2020 Update, WPI ECON. (Feb. 2020), https://www.homeless.org
.uk/sites/default/files/site-attachments/Local%20authority%20homelessness%20
spending%202020.pdf [https://perma.cc/YL4R-FDNF].
173. The U.K.’s Local Government Association commissioned a review of
lessons learned from the Everyone In response to the COVID-19 crisis in dealing
with rough sleeping and those at risk of it and how this can inform future policy
and practice. See Lessons Learnt, supra note 164.
174. Catherine Kim, It Took a Pandemic for Cities to Finally Address
Homelessness, VOX (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/21/212276
29/coronavirus-homeless-covid-19-las-vegas-san-francisco [https://perma.cc/67
QJ-5REC] (internal quotation omitted).
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As cities and states mobilized to protect homeless people, it was clear
that the homeless population was not only extremely vulnerable to the
disease, but also constituted a threat to others as “vectors” of infection.
When the U.K.’s Housing Minister wrote to local government officers to
explain the measures that central government was asking local authorities
to deliver, he explained:
The Government was also aware of the need to prevent
displacement and homelessness, in the light of the public health
risk this poses in relation to the spread of infection, and to reduce
pressures on essential public services during this time. . . . The
Government’s primary consideration is public health and the
potential strain on . . . an already overstretched NHS [National
Health Service] and local authority services. 175
In the U.S., this public-health-risk framing enabled federal authorities,
states, and cities to take measures previously unthought-of to ensure that
homeless people did not exacerbate the spread of the disease. Typically,
disaster relief shelters utilize large, open spaces, where many people are
gathered temporarily until other accommodations can be arranged. Many
homeless shelters follow this model, providing large auditorium-like
spaces where cots, mats, or other temporary bedding can shelter hundreds
of people at a time. COVID-19 forced policy makers to rethink this
strategy, as both FEMA176 and the governors of several states authorized
funding to provide for “non-congregant” shelters, or shelters that provided
individualized, private, closed-off spaces to prevent further spread of the
disease. 177 The states of California and Louisiana housed homeless people
175. Letter from Jane Everton, Social Housing Division, Ministry of Housing,
Communities & Local Government, to All Chief Executives, Chief Housing
Officers and Chief Officers for Children’s Services of Local Authorities in
England, (Sept. 7, 2020), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/corona
virus-act-2020-residential-tenancies-protection-from-eviction-amendment-engla
nd-regulations-2020-letter-to-local-authorities [https://perma.cc/P72H-AWP3].
176. See FEMA Policy 104-009-18 (Version 3), FEMA Emergency NonCongregate Sheltering During the Covid-19 Public Health Emergency (Interim)
(June 1, 2020 – June 30, 2021), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/doc
uments/fema_non-congregate-sheltering-during-the-covid-19-phe-v3_policy_129-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WTL-2PTA].
177. Governors in Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Ohio, and Vermont issued
executive orders to identify non-congregant housing options for individuals
experiencing homelessness or unable to safely self-quarantine. See Association of
State and Territorial Health Officials, How States are Housing the Homeless
During a Pandemic, ASTHO EXPERTS BLOG (May 20, 2020), https://www.as
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in hotel rooms to reduce their exposure—and the risk that they would
spread infection—in crowded shelters or on the streets. 178 The Governor
of New Hampshire took the extra step in ordering that all hotel space be
used only for emergency non-congregate housing or emergency
workers. 179 Additional resources were also directed to target assets of
resilience toward protection of women against domestic violence in
shelters, funds for food and transportation during the lockdown, and
additional funding for providers of healthcare to homeless populations.
In Ireland, the coincidence of a national general election in the spring
of 2020 added immediate political weight to public assessments of the
state’s response. The housing and homelessness crisis was already a major
issue going into this election, and the prospect of immediate electoral
implications brought the government’s political self-interest in responding
to the property dimensions of the crisis into sharp relief. As we have noted
elsewhere in the Article, the Irish government was already under
significant pressure from activists and social movements to tackle the
housing and homelessness crises that had endured since the 2008 Great
Recession burst the remnants of the “Celtic Tiger” bubble. In spring 2021,
the Chief Executive of one of Dublin’s homelessness charities was quoted
in The Irish Times as observing that the coronavirus pandemic “has
provided a ‘hidden opportunity’ for homeless services, allowing them to
move more people off the streets and into housing.” 180 While responses
that utilized vacant hotel or Airbnb rooms relied heavily on vacancies
opened up by the impact of lockdowns on tourism, other interventions—
including supported housing and physical modification of existing nonhousing structures to provide temporary housing and different ways of
working within shelter accommodation—were potentially more
tho.org/StatePublicHealth/How-States-are-Housing-the-Homeless-During-a-Pan
demic/05-20-20/ [https://perma.cc/7VBV-DHYC].
178. Other cities chose not to bring homeless people indoors. For example, Las
Vegas used a public parking area with sections taped off to create safe outdoor
sleeping spaces for homeless in their community.
179. N.H. Governor Emergency Order No. 27, Restriction of Hotels and Other
Lodging Providers to Provision of Lodging for Vulnerable Populations and
Essential Workers (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.governor.nh.gov/sites/g/files/
ehbemt336/files/documents/emergency-order-27.pdf#:~:text=Emergency%20Or
der%20%2327%20Pursuant%20to%20Executive%20Order%202020-04,Concer
ning%20the%20Novel%20Coronavirus%20Disease%20%28COVID-19%29%2
0Outbreak%3B%20and [https://perma.cc/FD6A-TZH9].
180. Jack Power, Covid-19 a ‘Hidden Opportunity’ for Homelessness
Services, IRISH TIMES (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/socialaffairs/covid-19-a-hidden-opportunity-for-homeless-services-1.4526596 [https://
perma.cc/AJ8N-HJH6].
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sustainable. Pleace and his coauthors noted that in Ireland—where the
state has come under major social movement pressure to tackle housing
over the last decade—homelessness policy was already undergoing a
sustained transition toward greater use of prevention and housingled/Housing First services. 181 Pleace and his coauthors suggested that
where the pandemic accelerated an approach that was already underway,
this was more likely to create more sustainable solutions. 182
In March 2021, the European Observatory on Homelessness published
an initial analysis evaluating the short-term, and potential long-term,
effects of COVID-19 on homelessness and housing exclusion. 183 The
report concluded that while “[t]here are many reasons to be concerned
about the current state of homelessness policies, especially in light of a
pandemic. . . . there are also reasons to be hopeful.” 184 Modified homeless
intervention polities noted that over the period of the pandemic, countries
across Europe and elsewhere had modified their homelessness
interventions. Many European countries managed to get most homeless
people off the street into safe accommodation in record time; many “nightonly” shelters had been converted to 24/7 shelters, with more singleoccupancy rooms made available; and there was a significant shift toward
housing-led and Housing First approaches to homelessness. 185 With
significant numbers of homeless people brought off the streets
[o]n a temporary basis, the “complex” problem of street
homelessness was largely and rapidly stopped. While there were
still operational problems and, sometimes, an ongoing absence of
a clear strategy to prevent an eventual return to the streets, there
were also reports of gains in wellbeing and health as people who
had been experiencing street homelessness were moved into
hotels. 186
While some of these jurisdictions had already adopted housing-led
strategies before the pandemic, in others—such as England—the
181. NICHOLAS PLEACE ET AL., EUROPEAN HOMELESSNESS AND COVID-19, at
31 (2021), https://www.feantsaresearch.org/public/user/Observatory/2021/Euro
pean_Homlessness_and_COVID-19Web_(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/XN39-W7NF].
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 4.
185. Id. (“The Corona-crisis made abundantly clear that access to adequate and
affordable housing is the best protection against the virus, and that housing people
experiencing homelessness is the most logical public-health intervention.”).
186. Id. at 7.
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pandemic triggered a sudden and significant shift to a new policy
paradigm.
Of course, it is important not to underestimate the challenges and costs
of delivering on commitments to support rough sleepers into
accommodations, either in the emergency context of the pandemic or in
the longer term, and the success of these initiatives is yet to be fully
evaluated. 187 The scale of responses reflected concerns that widespread
infection amongst the homeless population would accelerate the spread of
contagion across the population as a whole, with the prospect that once the
immediate risk of infection has passed—and with that, the immediate
threat to state resilience—governments would roll back on political
support and commitments to adequate long-term funding. Pleace and his
coauthors speculated that
[t]here is the possibility that some EU Member States and other
European countries will simply “switch off” specific measures at
a given point, ending eviction bans and extra support for people
experiencing street homelessness in an unplanned way, leading to
sudden, perhaps significant, spikes in homelessness. However,
much depends on how these policies are wound down and, as
appears to be the case for a few EU Member States, whether the
pandemic has prompted a wider re-think of homelessness policy,
prompting reorientation towards more integrated housingled/Housing First strategies that are likely to produce sustained
falls in homelessness. 188
Sustainable solutions to street homelessness will require infrastructure
and significant investment in affordable, secure homes, in a period when
some countries are likely to be facing post-pandemic economic problems.
From the vantage point of 2021, it remains unclear how sustainable
initiatives to shelter homeless populations will be in each jurisdiction.
Equally, it remains to be seen what the impact of the economic crises
triggered by the pandemic will be on the scale of the problem and what

187. The official narrative surrounding the U.K. government’s initiative was
“to offer accommodation to as many rough sleepers as possible in order to help
them stay safe during the pandemic.” Luke Hall, M.P., Minister for Rough
Sleeping and Housing, U.K. Parliamentary Business, COVID-19 Response:
Written Statement: HCWS263 (June 3, 2020), https://questions-statements.par
liament.uk/written-statements/detail/2020-06-03/HCWS263 [https://perma.cc/5Z
FT-Y9S2].
188. PLEACE ET AL., supra note 181, at 8.
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fresh threats this may present for governments seeking to restore and
maintain political, economic, and social equilibriums.
From a Resilient Property perspective, the political, economic, and
social pressures brought to bear on states—and crucially, political and
public attitudes to social and economic hardship after the pandemic in each
jurisdiction—will shape the window of political possibility in relation to
property, housing, and shelter in the wake of the pandemic. To the extent
that the allocation of resilience to homeless people aligns with the national
mood in some jurisdictions in the post-pandemic period, state action to
tackle homelessness—for example, through sustained public investment
in housing-led services for homeless people—may remain a political
possibility. At the very least, the disruption of pre-pandemic narratives—
individualized responsibility for homelessness, the non-responsibility of
states, and the “unsolvable” nature of street homelessness—are important
legacies of the pandemic. Pleace and his coauthors explained:
The problem of people experiencing street homelessness, so often
presented as “complex” and hence “difficult” to resolve, using a
very longstanding political narrative of “high and complex”
individual needs needing to be met, while the effects of multiple
systemic failures across economy, society, and the State were
downplayed was suddenly addressed through increased public
spending. “Everyone In” very rapidly cleared the streets of people
experiencing street homelessness and, for the most part, appears
to have kept them in the hotels and temporary accommodation that
was employed for the purpose. The specialist taskforce, set up to
orchestrate the next phase, has been working with local authorities
and the homelessness sector to ensure those accommodated
through “Everyone In” are helped into longer-term
accommodation, with a stated goal that as few people as possible
return to life on the streets. This policy is radical because it
undermines earlier government narratives that street based
homelessness was a “complex” social problem which was used to
explain why levels were increasing, drawing attention away from
expenditure cuts and other systemic drivers of street based
homelessness and because the Government itself claims that it
appears to be working. 189
Reflecting on parallel initiatives in Australia, Parsell and his coauthors
argued that the reframing of homelessness through the public-health
lens—redefining active state responses to tackle homelessness as essential
189. Id. at 33 (footnote omitted).
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to the goal of containing COVID-19—“[broke] with the prevailing
neoliberal/ individualising framework that has dominated homelessness
policy in recent decades.” 190 Rough sleepers were recast as people who
were “at risk,” and who needed state-funded support to keep them, and
others, safe. The framing of homelessness changed: from public order to
safety; punishment to support; an individual failing to a collective, public
challenge. Policy initiatives that had previously been unthinkable in terms
of political viability and popular support were rapidly implemented with
widespread support. The nomos and states pivoted in response.
C. Moratoria on Tenancy Evictions and Mortgage Repossessions
In parallel to the launch of major programs of fiscal support, furlough
payments, and shelter for homeless populations, states also acted swiftly
to implement temporary provisions to protect mortgagors and tenants from
the risk of evictions for non-payment of rent. Concerns about widespread
evictions due to lost economic opportunities during the pandemic
triggered eviction bans in many nation-states. These frequently applied to
both rental evictions and mortgage repossessions or foreclosures, with
legal remedies that landlords and creditors were normally entitled to
exercise to recover their properties following non-payment restricted or
withdrawn. Landlords and creditors were prevented from evicting
precariously housed tenants who defaulted on rent or mortgages due to
COVID-19. In some cases, eviction moratoria did not excuse the payment
of rent, but merely stayed the enforcement mechanism (eviction), although
some states intervened to limit the accrual of liabilities.
The moratoria on evictions were temporary—and often extended
piecemeal as the pandemic continued. In the U.S., at least six different
approaches to eviction moratoria were implemented by state, local, and
federal authorities.
1. The most basic step was the de facto moratorium on evictions that
resulted from the closure of courts. Twenty states 191 took no direct
action at the level of the state to pass legislation or otherwise order
a moratorium on evictions, but the closing of courts due to
lockdowns effectively temporarily halted evictions in each of
these states.
2. In these states, there were also some limitations on evictions
because of the federal CARES Act, which included a limited
190. Parsell et al., supra note 128, at 5.
191. Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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moratorium on evictions for economically vulnerable persons, and
the CDC’s Public Health State of Emergency, which limited
evictions on public-health grounds. Both moratoria were limited
to those cases in which individuals were unable to pay rent due to
the economic downturn and who had no other shelter options
available to them. Another state, Colorado, imposed by law a
requirement that landlords inform tenants of Federal Relief
Programs under the CARES Act or the CDC Emergency Public
Health Order as a requirement for proceeding with an eviction.
Oklahoma and Kentucky further limited state eviction protections
to only those who would qualify for protection under either the
CARES Act or the CDC moratorium.
3. Thirty states192 imposed their own moratoria on eviction,
proceedings to enforce evictions, or collection of fines relating to
non-payment of rent.
4. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, and California imposed an additional
moratorium on utility shutoffs for non-payment.
5. Maine and Michigan extended the time periods for notice and cure
of eviction proceedings, giving tenants more time to pay rent
liabilities accrued during the pandemic.
6. Delaware allowed landlords to continue to file eviction
proceedings but stayed enforcement until after the emergency
period ended.
Across the U.S., many of the orders contained common language: for
example, explicitly stating that the moratorium only applied to evictions
linked to non-payment of rent due to pandemic-related economic hardship.
Some stipulated other reasons why tenants could be evicted, including
damaging the property, committing violence against another resident or
the landlord, or if the landlord or their family required the property for use
as a primary residence. While many of the orders disallowed the
imposition of fines or penalties for nonpayment of rent, and even extended
the period in which rent would be deemed to be delinquent, orders also
commonly reiterated that they did not forgive or alleviate the obligation to
pay rent or past amounts owed to the landlord. In September 2020, the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) issued a nationwide moratorium
through December 31, 2020, on certain evictions as a public-health
measure. The order applied to tenants who either earned less than $99,000
192. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware (may file
but are stayed), District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.

2022]

COMPARATIVE PROPERTY LAW AND THE PANDEMIC

843

individually or $198,000 as a married couple in 2019; who were not
required to report income to the Internal Revenue Service in 2019; or who
received an Economic Impact Payment under the CARES Act. 193 The
CDC also required that recipients had used best efforts to attain
government assistance for housing; were able to certify that they were
unable to pay rent due to a substantial loss of income; were making best
efforts to make a timely payment of rent; and would become homeless or
need to move into a shared living setting if they were evicted.
In England, notice periods on rented housing were extended, 194 and all
possession proceedings were stayed, initially until at least September 20,
2020. 195 After the initial stay on possession proceedings (arguably, to
protect the resilience of the court system) expired, landlords were
permitted to progress their claims through the courts, with courts directed
to prioritize “the most egregious cases, such as those involving anti-social
behaviour and other crimes.”196 When a third lockdown was extended
from early January 2021 to June 2021, the eviction ban was reinstated until
May 31, 2021, and then further extended to September 20, 2021. Although
legislation barred bailiffs from serving eviction notices or carrying out
evictions until May 31, 2021, there were also exceptions for circumstances
that placed serious strain on landlords: 197 “illegal occupation, false
statement, anti-social behaviour, perpetrators of domestic abuse in the
social rented sector, where a property is unoccupied following the death
of a tenant and serious rent arrears greater than 6 months’ rent.” 198
193. Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread
of COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sep. 4, 2020),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/09/04/2020-19654/temporaryhalt-in-residential-evictions-to-prevent-the-further-spread-of-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/959R-NWLR].
194. Coronavirus Act 2020, c. 7, § 81, sch. 29 (Eng.).
195. Civil Procedure Rules [CPR] (Amendment No. 2) (Coronavirus) (Eng.)
Rules 2020 SI 2020/582; CPR (Amendment No. 5) (Coronavirus) (Eng.) Rules
2020 SI 2020/889; Hackney LBC v. Okoro [2020] EWCA (Civ) 681 (Eng.).
196. Guidance for Landlords and Tenants, MINISTRY OF HOUS., CMTYS &
LOC. GOV’T (Oct. 13, 2021), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
covid-19-and-renting-guidance-for-landlords-tenants-and-local-authorities/coron
avirus-covid-19-guidance-for-landlords-and-tenants [https://perma.cc/6BSF-UA
QB].
197. Id.
198. NEIGHBOURHOODS & ENV’T SCRUTINY COMM., MANCHESTER CITY
COUNCIL REPORT FOR INFORMATION (2021) (U.K.), https://democracy.
manchester.gov.uk/documents/s23378/Private%20Rented%20Sector%20Evictio
ns.pdf [https://perma.cc/FDP7-H8PQ]. In June 2021, the Ministry of Housing,
Communities and Local Government issued updated guidance for landlords and
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One consequence of the eviction bans in England was that by
September 2021, almost no legal evictions had taken place, and there was
little evidence of illegal evictions.199 A key concern in relation to the
temporary nature of eviction bans was the risk of a “tsunami” of evictions
once the bans were lifted—although Whitehead and Holman, evaluating
the likely impact of lifting the ban in England, suggested that limits on
court capacity to process significantly higher volumes of eviction cases
would likely result in a “slow burn” rather than an explosion of
evictions. 200 In July 2020, U.K. housing charity Crisis published a report
reflecting on the impact of the pandemic crisis response and possible exit
strategies. 201 It noted that while the Everyone In initiative had been
associated with very low levels of infection amongst homeless people, and
the speed and clarity of the early government response had ensured an
effective public-health strategy for this vulnerable population, there was
cause for concern that a spike in family homelessness would follow as the
evictions ban and financial support came to an end. 202 The Crisis report
urged the government to keep additional protections in place to avoid a
new eviction and homelessness crisis once emergency measures were
lifted.
While the CDC and federal legislation afforded temporary relief from
eviction to some occupiers, many in the U.S. were similarly concerned that
a “ticking time-bomb” was awaiting tenants when those moratoria would
expire and accrued rent or mortgage payments owed would become
actionable through eviction. Indeed, as temporary moratoria on eviction
came to an end, many were concerned that the legacies of the pandemic
would further deepen the affordable housing crisis. One analysis indicated
that “[n]early 12 million U.S. renters were expected to owe an average of
tenants, requiring (in most cases) four-months’ notice to quit, dropping to two
months from August 1, 2021—except for the “most serious” cases. One difference
between the 2021 Regulations (Public Health (Coronavirus) (Protection from
Eviction) (England) Regulations 2021) and the 2020 Regulations was that the
“substantial rent arrears” exception to the ban was reduced from nine months to
six months. With no stipulation as to when these arrears accrued, a claim for
possession could be based on six months of arrears accrued during the pandemic.
199. Christine Whitehead & Nancy Holman, Evictions: Where Are We Now?
What Needs to Change?, JUSTICE FOR LONDON, https://www.trustforlondon.org.
uk/news/evictionswherearewenow/ [https://perma.cc/DD7Y-UNLR] (last visited
Aug. 17, 2020).
200. Id.
201. Suzanne Fitzpatrick et al., Homelessness Monitor England 2020:
COVID-19 Crisis Response Briefing, CRISIS (July 2020), https://www.think
house.org.uk/site/assets/files/2188/crisis0820.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VCD-CDHE].
202. Id.
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almost $6,000 in late rent and utility payments per household by January
[2021].” 203 Some U.S. states offered rental assistance programs for tenants
who were financially impacted by the pandemic. 204
Activists, advocates, and social movements articulated demands for
sustained solutions to housing precarity, framing moratoria on evictions,
suspension of mortgage payments, and provision of shelter for the most
vulnerable in Airbnb or hotel rooms as precedents for what could be
achieved in the post-pandemic social struggle. 205 We have noted that in
the initial stage of the pandemic, the framing of the crisis as a public-health
challenge reopened “spaces of contestation” that were previously regarded
as closed, or viewed as outside the Overton window. Social movements
articulated concerns about ongoing housing shortages and precarity. For
example, in May 2020, the National Law Center on Homelessness and
Poverty released a four-page fact sheet titled “Racism, Homelessness and
Covid-19” that highlighted the intersections between these two problems
in communities of color in the U.S. The fact sheet provided details
explaining how people of color are particularly impacted by housing costs,
lack of access to healthcare, housing precarity, and homelessness, and
articulated key demands that advocates should make on state and local
officials. 206 Many of these demands were addressed in federal or state
203. Abby Vesoulis, Millions of Tenants Behind on Rent, Small Landlords
Struggling, Eviction Moratoriums Expiring Soon: Inside the Next Housing Crisis,
TIME (Feb. 18, 2021, 5:29 AM), https://time.com/5940505/housing-crisis-2021/
[https://perma.cc/2NA3-E55U].
204. Nine states provided for supplemental support for at-risk renters to assist
with paying rent: Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, New York, Texas, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin.
205. Luís Mendes, How Can We Quarantine Without a Home? Responses of
Activism and Urban Social Movements in Times of COVID-19 Pandemic Crisis
in Lisbon, 111 TIJDSCHR J. ECON. SOC. GEOGRAPHY 318, 327–38 (2020).
206. Id. These included:
• Actions that support people experiencing homelessness, who are
disproportionately Black and people of color:
- House people experiencing homelessness in hotels, motels
and/or RVs for the duration of the crisis, and plan now for
permanent housing after the crisis ends.
- Place moratoria on sweeping encampments, seizing tents, and
enforcing laws prohibiting resting and sheltering oneself in
public space.
- Place moratoria on vehicle ticketing, towing and impoundment.
- Immediately and safely decrease the number of people
incarcerated for laws criminalizing homelessness and other
non-violent offenses.
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policies in some form. However, commitments to sustaining these
measures waned as the crisis shifted from public health to economic.
Rachael Walsh has described how, alongside eviction bans, legislative
intervention to prevent rent increases during Ireland’s first lockdown
“mobili[zed] political support for a less conservative attitude towards the
protection of property rights . . . .”207 Rent control has been a controversial
issue in Ireland since two Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s cast
doubts on the constitutionality of such measures. 208 Indeed, against the
backdrop of the pre-pandemic, post-2008 housing and homelessness
crises, political resistance to such policies remained strong, with
opposition justified on the grounds that prohibitions on rent increases were
likely to be unconstitutional. Walsh explained, “The Covid-19 crisis
apparently prompted politicians to reconsider their views on the
constitutional parameters for legislative interventions that balance legal
protections for landlords and tenants.”209 In analyzing how the Residential
Tenancies and Valuation Act 2020 (apparently successfully) navigated
Schools and universities must take students experiencing
homelessness into account as they close down, including
ensuring students have the necessary tools to complete
schoolwork remotely.
- Ensure that any emergency cash relief measures designed to
assist people with the economic impact of the Coronavirus
crisis are also made available to and reach people experiencing
homelessness.
• Require public collection of data on COVID-19 cases and deaths by
race and ethnicity on federal, state, and local levels. Some states and
cities are still not publishing racial and ethnic data on COVID-19 cases
and deaths.
• Ensure adequate access to testing among communities of color.
• Implement rent relief: Eviction and rent moratoriums help with keeping
families in their homes during the crisis, but do not necessarily ensure
families’ housing security once the crisis is over.
• Paid sick leave and paid family medical leave.
• Provide hazard pay for essential workers.
• Reduce jail and prison populations and ensure that those who are
released can access non-congregate living situations.
207. Rachel Walsh, Securing Possession of the Home in the COVID-19
Context: The Irish Experience,’ in BOGGENPOEL ET AL., PROPERTY RESPONSES TO
A GLOBAL PANDEMIC (2021).
208. Blake v. Att’y Gen. [1982] I.R. 117 (lr.); In Re Article 26 of the
Constitution and the Housing (Private Rented Dwellings) Bill, 1981 [1983] I.R.
181 (lr.).
209. Walsh, supra note 207, at 2.
-
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this constitutional risk, Walsh highlighted the background resilience of
landlords as a group: “that group was large and apparently well-positioned
to defend its interests politically. . . . [T]he Irish Supreme Court in 2005
suggested that the property rights of vulnerable, politically weak groups
should receive particularly strong legal protection.” 210 Although
subsequent interventions placed greater emphasis on potential hardship for
landlords, Walsh suggested that “most fundamentally, the COVID-19
crisis may prove to be a turning point in softening political views on the
strength of constitutional property rights, paving the way for a better
alignment of Irish housing law and policy with . . . the common good and
social justice . . . .”211
In Barcelona, media linked the resumption of evictions once the ban
was lifted to a rise in suicides. 212 As Spain continued to grapple with the
legacies of the 2008 housing crisis, unemployment and precarious housing
depleted the resilience of economically marginalized populations. The
pandemic afforded some temporary relief from evictions. Court closures
left owners unable to exercise their legal power to evict tenants. In addition
to protections against possession actions, Spain adopted a moratorium on
mortgage payments. Private rental tenancy agreements due to end during
the crisis were extended by six months; a ban on tenancy evictions was
introduced; rents were frozen and in some cases reduced; and renters were
provided with access to government-backed bank loans to help them to
pay rent. 213 However, these protections were not available to all: while the
moratorium protected those who lost income due to the pandemic, it did
not protect those who were previously unemployed. Indeed, in the last
three months of 2020, when the country was still deep into the pandemic’s
second wave, 11,202 evictions were carried out, many of which were in
the Catalan Region, which includes the city of Barcelona.
This gap in the protection program was highlighted when a 60-yearold Ecuadorian immigrant living in Barcelona committed suicide after

210. Id. at 12.
211. Id. at 13.
212. Stephen Burgen, Barcelona Mayor Calls for Rethink on Evictions in
Wake of Suicides, GUARDIAN (June 15, 2021, 10:17), https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2021/jun/15/barcelona-mayor-calls-for-rethink-on-evictions-in-wake
-of-suicides?fbclid=IwAR3tbE6ceNSddO5eduS4c4ML8o3K8DkLxgduhPfb9uN
X8SRGxUyO04_09TA [https://perma.cc/8TQV-QLZA].
213. Jack Simpson, How Europe’s Housing Sector Has Responded to the
COVID-19 Crisis, INSIDE HOUS. (May 25, 2020, 7:10 AM), https://www
.insidehousing.co.uk/insight/insight/how-europes-housing-sector-has-respondedto-the-covid-19-crisis-66450 [https://perma.cc/M343-59PA].
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receiving an eviction notice. 214 Although he had been unemployed for two
years and was dependent on food banks for subsistence, he did not fit the
vulnerability criteria laid out in the state’s pandemic protection
program. 215 Although people whose housing claims were precarious
before the pandemic were equally vulnerable to eviction during the
pandemic, extending the eviction ban beyond the limits set out in the
legislation would have risked disrupting the commitments the state had
made before the pandemic. While the Irish government adapted its
position on rent control, the Spanish state responded to pressures to
maintain these commitments. This curtailed its scope for innovation
during the crises, with consequences that in turn generated new pressures
and strains, as political leaders were judged by the human impacts of their
decisions, in the new context of public attitudes and opinions.
IV. PROPERTY, CRISES, AND EQUILIBRIUM
By early summer 2021, with vaccination programs underway in the
U.S., the U.K., Ireland, Spain, and South Africa, and the end of the
pandemic seemingly in sight, governments began to transition from
emergency measures to business as usual. At that time, eviction moratoria
in the U.S. either had ended or were due to come to an end by June 30,
2021, and the focus turned to the aftermath of the pandemic for housing
and property claims, in the context of the economic crisis and the need to
stabilize the economy. A new set of questions emerged concerning legal
recourse for landlords and creditors in relation to accruals of unpaid rent.
In early 2021, Congress passed the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan to
provide many Americans with an additional $1,400 one-time relief
payment, while setting aside funding for schools, vaccine programs, and
direct payments to cities that were facing significant budgetary shortfalls
to fund key infrastructure needs, such as police and fire protection, transit,
and libraries.216 By May 2021, nearly 40% of American adults were fully
vaccinated, while nearly 50% of adults had received at least one dose of a
vaccine. 217 In Spain, the national state of emergency—which provided the
214. Burgen, supra note 212.
215. Id.
216. Jim Tankersley & Michael Crowley, Biden Outlines $1.9 Trillion
Spending Package to Combat Virus and Downturn, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/14/business/economy/biden-economy.html
[https://perma.cc/Z667-VV6Q].
217. US Coronavirus vaccine tracker, USA FACTS, https://usafacts.org/visual
izations/covid-vaccine-tracker-states/ [https://perma.cc/N6FL-PGVY] (last updated
Mar. 14, 2022).
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legal authority for curfews, lockdowns, and other measures that
constrained individuals’ civil liberties—expired on May 3, 2021.
However, on the eve of the state of emergency being lifted, the Deputy
Prime Minister indicated that regional authorities could seek permission
from the court to reimpose follow-on restraints. At the same time, the
Spanish government extended protections for vulnerable tenants and
homeowners at risk of eviction, previously linked to the state of
emergency, through August 9, 2021. 218
State responses to the property crises of the pandemic can be
conceptualized in terms of distinct phases. The first phase was defined by
the immediate public-health crisis: in a context of global “lockdowns,”
many states took radical steps to bring the homeless into shelter and to ban
tenancy and/or mortgage evictions. While government initiatives to keep
people in their homes and to bring the homeless into shelter had a
significant impact in preserving the health and wellbeing of homeless and
precariously housed people, these measures were not exclusively—or
perhaps even primarily—motivated by the need to protect the resilience of
homeless or precariously housed people themselves. In many places, the
“public health crisis” lens rapidly converted previously unthinkable policy
interventions into viable policy options—because the resilience needs of
homeless and precariously housed people had become aligned with the
resilience needs of the wider community and governments themselves.
Contrasting the unprecedented scale of commitment, investment, and
ambition demonstrated by governments such as those in the U.K., U.S.,
and elsewhere to tackling homelessness and housing precarity during the
pandemic with the “policy stasis and poverty of ambition” that
characterized state responses to homelessness in the decade before the
pandemic, 219 Parcell and his coauthors observed that “the potential impact
of the disease on the health of the homeless is not the sole driver of these
drastic interventions; rather, it is the risk that their heightened vulnerability
to contracting and spreading the disease poses to the health of the housed
population.” 220
However, as the public-health crisis receded, and the homelessness
crisis, eviction crisis, property crisis, and post-pandemic economic crisis
were foregrounded, the state’s resilience needs were recalibrated, creating
new policy imperatives. A second phase, overlapping with the first,
218. Spain’s Regions Need Court Cacking for Covid-19 Restrictions, REUTERS
(May 4, 2021, 8:53 AM CDT), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/spain-letregions-decide-covid-19-restrictions-may-9-2021-05-04/ [https://perma.cc/3S4Z
-DTEK].
219. Parsell et al., supra note 128, at 7 (internal quotations omitted).
220. Id. at 2–3.
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emerged as states transitioned from “lockdown” to “reopening.” For
many, this included the reopening of courts and resumption of evictions,
enforcement, and bailiff procedures—raising questions about the impacts
of a return to “normal” enforcement practices for evictions, repossessions,
and foreclosures. The loss of the state-backed resilience of the eviction ban
exposed the vulnerability of households that were already in a precarious
financial position prior to the pandemic, those who had lost income and
accumulated housing debt during the pandemic, and those who were
unable to sustain their housing costs. A key consideration in this second
phase concerned which types of response were most likely to generate
resilience for states seeking economic recovery.
A state’s ability to be responsive to new challenges in times of crisis
(such as mobilizing resources to address housing shortages even for a short
time) requires flexibility, adaptation, recovery, and innovation. In this
recovery phase, a crucial question facing city, local, regional, and national
authorities was which adjustments were temporary—time-limited to the
immediate public-health crisis—and which adjustments would have an
ongoing impact beyond this initial period—becoming part of the “new
normal.” Jason Hackworth has argued that the Overton window of U.S.
urban politics shifted dramatically to the political right following the 2008
housing crisis: normalizing the “entrepreneurial state” and moving the
political debate to question whether the state had any role to play in
managing urban affairs. Hackworth described the role of policy thinktanks in “shift[ing] the window to the right to make once unrealistic policy
ideas possible, or if they are really successful, inevitable.”221 Likewise, in
the U.K., Ireland, Spain, and elsewhere, neoliberal-leaning governments
responded to the 2008 housing crisis with “austerity policies.”222 These
resonated with transnational trends of urban restructuring around a “rentist,
221. Jason Hackworth, The Normalization of Market Fundamentalism in
Detroit: The Case of Land Abandonment, in REINVENTING DETROIT: THE
POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 77 (Michael Peter Smith & L. Owen Kirkpatrick eds.,
2015).
222. Iker Barbero, When Rights Need to Be (Re)Claimed: Austerity Measures,
Neoliberal Housing Policies and Anti-Evictioni Activism in Spain, 35 CRITICAL
SOC. POL’Y 270 (2015); IRELAND UNDER AUSTERITY, supra note 16; Walter
Korpi & Joakim Palme, New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity
and Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries, 1975–95, 97 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 425 (2003); Héloïse Nez, We Must Register a Victory to Continue
Fighting” Locating the Action of the Indignados in Madrid, in STREET POLITICS
IN THE AGE OF AUSTERITY 121–46 (Héloïse Nez et al. eds., 2016); Mark Stephens
& Adam Stephenson, Housing Policy in the Austerity Age and Beyond, in SOCIAL
POLICY REVIEW: ANALYSIS AND DEBATE IN SOCIAL POLICY 63 (2016).
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extractivist and predatory model of austerity urbanism that generated
numerous phenomena of accumulation by dispossession taking advantage
of capital gains produced by an overheated housing market . . . .”223
Around the world, social movements mobilized against these austerity
responses, arguing that pre-pandemic housing crises were produced by
policies of “transnational gentrification, real estate speculation and
financialisation of housing.” 224 However, and notwithstanding the scale of
global visibility achieved by movements like Occupy, the impact of these
groups in achieving lasting change—in moving the Overton window of
political possibility—was dissipated by the persuasive power of the “think
tanks, banks, corporations, and advocacy groups . . . advanc[ing] a
disembedded market agenda . . . .”225 Those who opposed the social
movements’ agendas in favor of market-led approaches were “far more
organized, funded, numerous, and established than the forces seeking to
advance . . . postcapitalist solution[s].” 226 Yet notwithstanding limited
success in achieving their goals in the Great Recession period, these same
social movements, which had organized around affordable housing policy,
anti-austerity, and rising inequalities in the pre-pandemic period, provided
the early critiques that framed the scale of the property challenges
triggered by the pandemic as a reflection of failed housing and austerity
policies over the previous ten years.
The global pandemic revealed the capacity for states to respond in
flexible ways, at least temporarily, to particular problems. However, that
ability to be flexible may be conditional on the public-health frame. As
states attempt to return to normalcy and to lay the foundations for
economic recovery in the face of recession and economic downturn
following the pandemic, it is not yet clear whether the experience of the
crises—the widening of the Overton window—will have a lasting impact
on the property nomos, property politics, and property law. Of course, the
nature and scale of any lasting impacts is likely to vary by jurisdiction—
contextualized by the evolving national nomos and by political and public
responses across national jurisdictions.
A key question in this phase, as states work to recover political and
economic equilibrium, concerns the potential scope for state actors to
anticipate how the politics of public opinion will be affected by the crises.
The pandemic has made newly visible these demands for resilience, and
the acceptance by states of responsibility—as well as their success in
223.
224.
225.
226.

Mendes, supra note 205.
Id.
Hackworth, supra note 221, at 75.
Id.
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implementing responses—has revealed the capacity of state actors and
agencies to tackle housing and property crises when sufficient pressure is
brought to bear and there is enough public support. At the same time, as
the use and occupation of cities has been transformed—initially through
lockdowns, and now as city workers, city dwellers, city authorities, and
city planners reevaluate the post-pandemic landscape—new models are
emerging for the restructuring of the city. 227 Urban scholars have forecast
four potential areas for change: (1) loss of social opportunity during
lockdowns and lingering trepidation around large-scale gatherings; (2) a
more-or-less successful experiment with remote working and shopping
experiences; (3) changes to public security around public spaces—for
example, enhanced sanitary standards; and (4) adaptations to the physical
form of the built environment during the pandemic that have lasting
effects. 228
Some evidence has suggested a modest urban exodus since the
pandemic began in March 2020. 229 One unexpected impact of this
movement of people in the U.S. was the artificial inflation of real estate
prices elsewhere, as city-dwellers relocated from pricey urban real estate
markets to newly more desirable locations. One analyst observed that for
employees in many industries, working remotely during the pandemic has
effectively untethered them from their physical offices. 230 Historically, but
even more so during the pandemic, those with higher-income jobs are the
most likely to work from home. 231 As higher-paid workers have chosen to
move from expensive urban housing to lower-cost locations, 232 a new type
of housing gap has emerged, prompted by the pressure on housing supply
in previously lower-cost areas as well-to-do buyers have outpriced
227. Richard Florida et al., Cities in a Post-COVID World, 2021 URBAN
STUDIES 1, 2 (2021).
228. Id. at 3.
229. See Stephen D. Whitaker, Did the Covid-19 Pandemic Cause an Urban
Exodus, FED. RSRV. BANK OF CLEVELAND (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.cleve
landfed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/cfed-district-data-briefs/cfddb
-20210205-did-the-covid-19-pandemic-cause-an-urban-exodus.aspx [https://per
ma.cc/3ENF-C9ML].
230. Susan Lund et al., What’s Next for Remote Work? An Analysis of 2,000
Tasks, 800 Jobs, and Nine Countries, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST. (Nov. 23, 2020),
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/whats-next-for-rem
ote-work-an-analysis-of-2000-tasks-800-jobs-and-nine-countries [https://perma.
cc/5XRY-YJWT].
231. Id.
232. Ali Wolf, Here’s Who Will Be Left Behind in the Housing Boom, N.Y.
TIMES (July 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/13/opinion/covidhousing-phoenix-austin.html?smid=tw-share [https://perma.cc/6J2J-EWUT].
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markets. The high-end homes left behind by city-dwellers opting to
relocate may be converted to upscale short-term rentals rather than
permanent housing. While the entrepreneurial city thrives on attracting
talent, it does not necessarily need that talent to settle there for the longterm.
Newly emerging patterns in housing preferences and use of housing
stock could not have been predicted by cities or analysts before the
pandemic. Indeed, in Farsighted: How We Make the Decisions that Matter
the Most, Steven Johnson highlighted the ways that limited foresight
amongst decision-makers restricts their ability to respond effectively to
longer-term problems. Drawing on the much-lampooned statement of
Donald Rumsfeld during the Iraq War—that they faced “unknown
unknowns”—Johnson highlighted the critical importance of developing
and adopting methods of mapping problems that identify the blank
spaces. 233 As Johnson explained, mapping problems involves identifying
not only the things we are certain of (the known knowns), but also the
things we don’t know (the known unknowns) and the blind spots we don’t
yet know we know about (the unknown unknowns). Reflecting on how
this can be achieved, Johnson cited Tetlock’s landmark study on long-term
forecasting, which identified the most important factor for successful
forecasters: that they were characterized not by what they knew but by
how they thought. He observed:
One group tended to organize their thinking around Big Ideas,
although they didn’t agree on which Big Ideas were true or false.
Some were environmental doomsters (“We’re running out of
everything”); others were cornucopian boomsters (“We can find
cost-effective substitutes for everything”). Some were socialists
(who favored state control of the commanding heights of the
economy); others were free-market fundamentalists (who wanted
to minimize regulation). As ideologically diverse as they were,
they were united by the fact that their thinking was so ideological.
They sought to squeeze complex problems into the preferred
cause-effect templates and treated what did not fit as irrelevant
distractions. . . . As a result they were unusually confident and
likelier to declare things “impossible” or “certain.” . . . The other
group consisted of more pragmatic experts who drew on many
analytical tools, with the choice of tool hinging on the particular
problem they faced. These experts gathered information from as
many sources as they could. . . . They talked about possibilities
233. STEVEN JOHNSON, FARSIGHTED: HOW WE MAKE
MATTER THE MOST 59 (2018).
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and probabilities, not certainties. And while no one likes to say, “I
was wrong,” these experts more readily admitted it and changed
their minds. 234
Tetlock’s description resonates with the approach we have developed in
Resilient Property: that the most effective methodological approaches to
tackle complex problems are not through linear problem-solving methods
or the application of grand theories, but by mapping the problem space
while maintaining a sense of epistemic humility.
As states prepare to tackle the complex problems of the post-pandemic
periods, they face numerous unknowns. The exact contours of that postpandemic period are not yet clear; thus, flexibility to adapt to new
information as it is revealed will remain vital. Flexibility is a fundamental
determinant of resilience. The urgency with which actions were taken in
the coronavirus pandemic provide a sightline into the capacity—and
willingness, under sufficient pressure to do so—for even some erstwhile
neoliberal states to upscale putatively social-welfarist norms without
depleting their own resilience. Indeed, in the context of the pandemic,
these responses enhanced the resilience of states, as they faced their own
crises of hegemony. They needed to be seen to take decisive and effective
actions to control the virus and restore political and economic equilibrium,
as well as tackle the public-health crisis.
While longer-term forecasts are highly speculative—and we remain
committed to epistemic humility—property theorists will inevitably
reflect on what, if any, lasting legacy the pandemic crises might hold for
property politics, property law, and legal thought. In liberal property
systems, we are accustomed to thinking about evictions as private
disputes, between two transactional parties. Since the withdrawal of safety
nets and the depletion of statutory protections for tenants from the 1980s,
the state’s role in these property law actions has been seen as largely
limited to the recognition and enforcement of rights-based claims. Yet the
scale of the global pandemic has brought the state’s own stake in property
transactions, particularly in relation to homelessness and housing
precarity, into clearer view. However, the scales of political and public
opinion settle upon these questions in each jurisdiction in the decades to
come, we have seen behind the curtain of putatively private property law.
The state’s own stake in these property actions has been revealed.

234. Id. at 84 (citing PHILIP E. TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER,
SUPERFORECASTING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PREDICTION (2015)).
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V. CONCLUSION
The first major global pandemic in the western world was the Black
Death, from 1346 to 1353. Robert Palmer traced the impact of the Black
Death on English private law, describing the transformation that followed:
from an old paradigm based on the king’s authority, to a new acceptance
of the inherent authority of the state. 235 Palmer argued that one
consequence of this transition—which embedded the legitimacy of law as
a function of the inherent authority of the state—was the “scaling up” of
previously local concerns to the national legal jurisdiction. Private
disputes between subjects—for example, contract disputes, tortious
wrongdoing and remedies, labor and employment issues, and crucially,
property rights—were brought under the newly developed jurisdiction of
private law. Palmer argued that this paradigm shift was a mechanism for
reestablishing the social status quo that had existed prior to the pandemic.
In the aftermath of the pandemic, English aristocratic leaders set out to
create a new national legal system, organizing the power of the state
through law. They needed to reestablish social equilibrium—adapting to
the changed context to ensure that pre-pandemic power dynamics between
the lower and upper levels of society would be sustained. Although the
inherent power of the state’s private law jurisdiction would later be
concealed behind putatively neutral legal structures, the paradigm shift
was necessary to restore equilibrium after the pandemic: the state acted to
preserve the social order that gave it power.
Palmer’s account of the evolution of private law in line with state selfinterest, to shore up its resilience following a period of crisis, resonates
with our theory of Resilient Property. Periods of crises draw back the
curtain on the state’s often unseen role in private property law, casting
fresh light on how organizing structures are deployed to advance
individual and collective agendas, and on how these align with state selfinterest. In moments of crises, the so-called public/private divide becomes
permeable, and the state’s stake in the private realm becomes visible as
states direct what were erstwhile private matters. In moments of crises, the
pressures and risks that states face for failing to act in the face of urgent
property problems often trump the pressures and risks they face if they are
seen to have overreached the scope of their legitimate authority. The fact
that states can actively direct property systems during these times, and that
these actions function to shore up rather than deplete the state’s resilience,
provides an important corrective to claims that state actors and agencies,
235. ROBERT PALMER, ENGLISH LAW IN THE AGE OF THE BLACK DEATH 1348–
1381: A TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE AND LAW (1993).
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private property systems, legal techniques, and toolkits lack the capacity
to respond to property’s wicked problems. Rather, it reveals the question
of active state responses to wicked property problems as one of political
possibility.

